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EXTRA! EXTRA! READ ALL ABOUT IT:
WHAT A PLAINTIFF "KNOWS OR SHOULD
KNOW" BASED ON OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS
AND MEDIA COVERAGE OF POLICE
MISCONDUCT FOR NOTICE OF A § 1983
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CLAIM
Jenny Rivera*
Although the plaintiffs § 1983 claim is a strong one . .. [the
plaintiffs] failure to file within the limitations period cannot be
excused. The [plaintiffs] cause of action is therefore dismissed as
to the municipal defendants.1
[W]hen commencing a [police misconduct suit] neither the plain-
tiff nor [the plaintiffs] attorney is likely to know much about the
relevant internal operations of the police department, nor about
the disciplinary history and record of the particular police officers
involved. In view of the strong policies favoring suits protecting
the constitutional rights of citizens ... it would be inappropriate
to require plaintiffs and their attorneys before commencing suit to
obtain the detailed information needed to prove a pattern of su-
pervisory misconduct ....
Recent revelations of police misconduct throughout the country
have sparked renewed demands for improved police accountability
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law at
Queens College. Columbia University School of Law, LL.M.; New York University
School of Law, J.D.; Princeton University, A.B.
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and supervision.3 As investigative committees have identified and
highlighted the link between police corruption and police brutality,
requests for external controls have increased. Indeed, calls for in-
dependent federal monitors in cases of police brutality reflect the
dissatisfaction with, and intolerance of, police misconduct and
abuse, as well as the growing recognition that local police depart-
ments do not or cannot police themselves. 4 As citizens' disaffec-
tion from law enforcement personnel and institutions grows, so
does the urgent need for change.
Unfortunately, change in the form of increased accountability
and reduced police corruption has proved elusive. Litigation, a
traditional vehicle for change, has had limited success in transform-
ing law enforcement at an institutional level.5 The overall costs to
the government and the public coffers have not stemmed police
misconduct at a level commensurate with the substantial judgments
3. E.g., Bruce Shapiro, When Justice Kills; After Years of Decline Police Brutality
Is on the Rise, Sparking a Reform Movement, THE NATION, June 9, 1997, at 21 (stating
that the emphasis of reformers is on independent review boards and special prosecu-
tors); Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, More Civilian Watchdogs Patrol Thin Blue Line, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 10, 1996, at 3 (discussing civilian complaint re-
view panels) [hereinafter More Civilian Watchdogs].
4. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT, LAW ENFORCEMENT:
INFORMATION ON DRuG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION: REPORT TO THE HONORA-
BLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1998) (noting that various
sources have recommended external oversight of police departments) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]; CITY OF NEW YORK COMM'N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: How THE DEPART-
MENT DISCIPLINES ITS MEMBERS WHO MAKE FALSE STATEMENTS (1996) [hereinafter
COMMISSION TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION]; CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTI-
GATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCE-
DURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT (1994) (calling for independent
oversight commission) [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT]; COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE AL-
LEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE CITY's ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES,
THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 14-15 (1972) (calling for
independent investigator and prosecutor) [hereinafter KNAPP REPORT]; Neil Graves,
Louima Breaks Down in Tears at Support Rally, N.Y. POST, Aug. 10, 1998, at 6 (Public
Advocate Mark Green calls for federal monitor of police corruption); Bob Herbert,
The Stone Wall of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A25 (police oppose indepen-
dent agency to investigate police misconduct); David Kocieniewski, Mayor to Raise
Pay of Officers on City Beats, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at B1 (discussing the recom-
mendation of certain members of Mayor Giuliani's Task Force on Police/Community
Relations to establish special prosecutor to investigate allegations of police wrongdo-
ing); Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Reviews Police Killing of Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 1998, at B3 (United States Attorney Zachary Carter monitors state investigation of
police shooting of unarmed person); More Civilian Watchdogs, supra note 3.
5. E.g., Comm. on New York City Affairs of the Ass'n of The Bar of the City of
New York, The Failure of Civil Damages Claims to Modify Police Practices, and Rec-
ommendations for Change, 55 THE REC. 533 (2000) (discussing failure of the tort sys-
tem to increase police accountability for violations of civil rights).
NOTICE OF A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
and settlements that have been paid by states and municipalities.6
To increase pressure for public accountability and decrease police
misconduct, victims of police misconduct must have greater access
to the legal system, and the availability of legal recourse through
civil rights actions must be improved. This is particularly true for
litigation against localities for poor or nonexistent supervision and
discipline of officers for police misconduct. While these actions are
the most difficult to prove, they are the most likely to bring about
change because they challenge institutional actors and problems,
rather than concentrating solely upon individual police officers and
their bad acts.'
More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court concluded in
Monell v. Department of Social Services" that cities are "persons"
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 for violations of rights guar-
anteed under the United States Constitution and laws.10 Pursuant
6. E.g., id. at 534 (noting that New York City paid $140 million in damages for
alleged police abuses in fiscal years 1994-95 and 1998-99).
7. Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Claims Against Municipal Officer and Mu-
nicipality, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2000, at 3 (discussing that municipal liability § 1983
claims "can be factually and legally complex, cumbersome, and very time consuming
for counsel and the court") [hereinafter Schwartz, Section 1983 Claims].
8. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. The statute reads, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
10. The Supreme Court's decision in Monell overruled its prior holding in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that local governments were not "persons" subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Monell decision provided a new avenue of relief for
plaintiffs, but not without continuing uncertainty and conflict within the Supreme
Court and among the circuit courts concerning the parameters of claims against local
governments. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-31 (1997)
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ.) (noting that § 1983 munici-
pal liability interpretive law is highly complex and difficult to apply); City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1989) (determining existence of causal link between
policy and constitutional deprivation has left the Court "deeply divided in a series of
cases" decided after Monell ... and the Court has had difficulty "defining the con-
tours of municipal liability"); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (referencing Courts of Appeals' divergent interpretations of prin-
ciples set forth in Supreme Court's § 1983 opinions); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985) (plurality opinion) (noting the murky state of the law of
municipal liability under § 1983 post-Monell). See generally 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, ch. 6
(4th ed. West Group 2000) (digesting various cases from circuit courts addressing mu-
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to Monell and its progeny, a plaintiff can sue a municipality for its
direct actions, as well as for municipal policies resulting in a consti-
tutional tort.11 In the years following the watershed decision in
nicipal liability); [hereinafter NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS] 1B MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ &
JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, §§ 7.6-7.11 (3d
ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (tracing historical development of Supreme Court's analysis
of municipal liability) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION].
11. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) (holding that municipal liability suits are not subject to
heightened pleading requirement, and that immunity defense not available to munici-
pal defendant); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (noting that
§ 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violations by state actors of rights guaran-
teed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 (holding that local government
may be liable where failure reflects "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact") (footnote omitted); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at
112 (holding that actions of municipal employee with decisionmaking authority, as
determined by state law, may be basis for municipality's liability); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that a single act by a mu-
nicipal decisionmaker with final authority may constitute a municipal policy subject-
ing municipality to § 1983 liability); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650
(declining to extend the municipality qualified immunity since employee's good faith
is no bar to damages against municipality); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (declaring that
local governments are subject to suit under § 1983 for damages, and declaratory and
injunctive relief).
Plaintiffs do not have a § 1983 remedy against the states, however, because states
are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages
against the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 6:67-6:69, vol. 2, §§ 9:48-9:50; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 10, ch. 8. Plaintiffs initially sought to reach the states' deep
pockets by suing state officials in their official capacity-actions known as "official-
capacity suits." The Supreme Court put an end to these efforts when it concluded that
such suits must be treated as suits against the government entity the officials re-
present. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). As a consequence, state
officials in these suits are not liable for damages. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Plaintiffs' persis-
tence paid off, however, when the Court subsequently held that state officials sued in
their personal capacity-"personal capacity suits"-are "persons" under § 1983, and
may be personally liable for damages. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 371).
To the benefit of plaintiffs, states generally indemnify individual defendants in
these suits. E.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing states that indemnify employees for § 1983 liability, for actions within scope of
their employment); see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-K (McKinney 1999) (requiring
New York City pay civil damages imposed against employees); Comm. on New York
City Affairs of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, The Failure of Civil
Damages Claims to Modify Police Practices, and Recommendations for Change, 55
THE RECORD 533, 540 (2000) (discussing the failure of the current New York tort
system to "modify the conduct of persons and organizations found liable" in the New
York Police Department, despite the millions in settlement and judgment damages
paid by New York City in police abuse cases).
Moreover, plaintiffs also may affect state policy, protocols and other actions
through a § 1983 suit to the extent that plaintiffs may proceed against state officials in
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Monell, the Court has struggled intensely to define the parameters
of § 1983 municipal liability.12 The result has been a series of cases
that seemingly provide relief against localities, but based on a the-
ory of direct liability, which requires a plaintiff to show more than
that a municipality's employees acted badly. This requirement of
direct municipal action has proved to be a tremendous obstacle to
plaintiffs. Having eschewed a respondeat superior theory of liabil-
ity in actions against municipalities, the Court has given with one
hand and taken with the other.13
an official capacity suit for injunctive relief. In these actions state actors are treated as
individuals. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14).
12. E.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404 (holding that the conduct attrib-
utable to municipality was insufficient to establish liability because plaintiff must es-
tablish municipal culpability and "a direct causal link between the municipal action
and the deprivation of federal rights"); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that a municipality is not liable where a jury finds
the individual officer did not commit a constitutional injury); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388
(imposing a "deliberate indifference" standard in failure to train case); Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 130 (declaring that failure to investigate "subordinate's discretionary deci-
sions" alone does not constitute delegation of municipal policymaking authority);
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (declaring that municipal liability requires decision of those
with final policymaking authority); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 271 (1981) (declaring that municipalities are immune from punitive damages
under § 1983); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823 (holding that the act of one employee without
policymaking power is insufficient to establish municipal policy of inadequate train-
ing). But see Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 830-31 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A single police
officer may grossly, outrageously, and recklessly misbehave in ... a single incident...
attributable to various municipal policies or customs ... [that] were the 'moving force'
... or cause of the violation.") (internal citation omitted). See generally SCHWARTZ,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, ch. 7 (discussing municipal and supervisory
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a discussion and critique of the Court's holdings
on municipal policies and customs, see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Si-
lence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17
(2000).
13. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory."). Members of the Court, in particular Justice Ste-
vens, and several commentators, have questioned the wisdom of the Court's rejection
of a respondeat superior theory in § 1983 municipal liability actions. E.g., Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 430-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Gins-
burg, JJ.) (arguing for reexamination of § 1983 and questioning soundness of Monell
principle rejecting vicarious municipal liability); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 148, n.1 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("Like many commentators who have confronted the question, I
remain convinced that Congress intended the doctrine of respondeat superior to ap-
ply in § 1983 litigation.") (citations omitted); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 489-90 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (advocating for application of respondeat
superior to municipal liability claims); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 834-44 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that respondeat superior was historically a part of the common law doc-
trine that is incorporated into § 1983); Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape:
The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1518 (1993) (arguing that respondeat superior should apply
to police officers); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
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Although a Moneil-based municipal liability claim seems to pro-
vide tremendous opportunities for redress of injuries caused by
municipal government actions, it is no panacea for the neophyte
plaintiff who is unskilled in the intricacies of civil practice and civil
rights litigation. The plaintiff seeking to assert such a claim faces
myriad obstacles in filing, and eventually succeeding, against a mu-
nicipality. As with all other civil actions, such a claim must satisfy
general procedural and substantive requirements. Furthermore,
the claimant must meet certain evidentiary requirements unique to
§ 1983 municipal liability claims, and must also satisfy a direct cau-
sation requirement, which is onerous both in theory and practice.
Recognition of the plaintiff's injury and the source of that injury,
matters intricately tied to these same evidentiary requirements, can
have a significant impact on the viability of a municipal liability
claim. Notice of the injury commences the running of the statutory
time limit on the claim.' 4 As a consequence, a significant initial
hurdle is determining the durational limit for the timely filing of
the complaint. Should a plaintiff fail to file within the time limit,
the plaintiff is generally barred from ever seeking § 1983 redress
for the claimed injury, regardless of the merits of the underlying
claim. 5
Section 1983 does not contain a federal statute of limitations.'6
To fill this statutory lacuna, the courts turn to state law,' 7 and
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 820-38 (1992) (recommending application
of a modified theory of respondeat superior against municipalities) [hereinafter Re-
shaping Section 1983].
14. Infra notes 21, 42 and accompanying text.
15. A § 1983 claim period, however, may be tolled pursuant to applicable state
tolling provisions, allowing a plaintiff to proceed with the action. Bd. of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (applying both state statute of limitations and tolling
rules to § 1983 claim); Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 50 (1983) (applying Puerto Rico's
tolling rules to § 1983 claims) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)).
Moreover, a § 1983 claim is subject to equitable tolling principles. Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Hence, even a plaintiff whose action is barred by the time
limitations requirement may be the beneficiary of a toll of that period for various
reasons, including the existence of actions by the defendant which effectively under-
mine plaintiff's ability to file within the time limit. But see infra note 264, discussing
the circuit courts' reconsideration of the applicability of federal equitable estoppel
principles pursuant to Holmberg in § 1983 cases in light of the Court's subsequent
decision in Hardin v. Straud, 490 U.S. 536 (1989).
16. The absence of a federal statute of limitations is "a void which is commonplace
in federal statutory law." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (quoting Bd. of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483 (1980)).
17. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 permits application of state law to § 1983 actions
because,
[the federal civil rights statutes] shall be exercised and enforced in conform-
ity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry
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"borrow" the state's limitations period."a The appropriate limita-
tions period is "the general or residual [state] statute for personal
injury actions."19
Although state statutory limitation periods apply to § 1983 ac-
tions, the accrual of such actions-the point at which the statutory
time commences-is governed by federal law.2 0 As a consequence,
a determination of the timeliness of a § 1983 claim may involve
consideration of both state and federal decisional and statutory
law.
The Supreme Court has calculated the accrual period from that
point in time when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury that is the basis of the legal claim.21 This standard ostensibly
the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1988 as requiring a "'three-step process' in
determining the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims." Wilson, 471 U.S. at
267. This test, as applied to statute of limitations questions under § 1983, requires
that,
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws
are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect."
[42 U.S.C. § 1988.] If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the
second step by considering application of state "common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. A third
step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply
state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984) (second alteration added) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985) (holding that state per-
sonal injury statutes of limitations apply to § 1983 actions); Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 483-
84; Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655 (1983) (applying Puerto Rican law).
19. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989).
20. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a § 1983
claim for unlawful conviction and imprisonment accrues when the state declares such
conviction or imprisonment invalid); Pauk v. Bd. of Trs., 654 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir.
1981) ("Federal law determines when a claim accrues under § 1983.") (citation omit-
ted); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Federal law...
'establishes as the time of accrual that point in time when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action."') (quoting Bireline v.
Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1977)); cf Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250 (1980) (discussing accrual under § 1981).
21. See, e.g., Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (holding that the Title VII action limitations
period runs from when tenure decision is made and communicated to plaintiff, since
that is the discriminatory act); Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (holding
2000]
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appears plaintiff-friendly because it seems to consider the possibil-
ity that a plaintiff's knowledge of events might be delayed, which
would impact the plaintiff's ability to recognize and act on a § 1983
claim. As a result, under certain circumstances, the plaintiff may
have more time, cumulatively, than would appear to be provided
for, chronologically, under the state's limitation statute. Plaintiffs
and their representatives may, however, have the impression-
often well founded-that the triggers for determining the point of
accrual are less salutary than initially suggested by the standard. In
practice, plaintiffs lack the necessary legal knowledge, familiarity
with the legal system, and facts about the municipality's actions
and policies to discern a legally redressable injury.22 In other
words, plaintiffs may have insurmountable difficulty in determining
that they have a claim against a municipality.23
A determination of when a plaintiff knew, or should have
known, that the defendant's conduct could be the basis of a
redressable § 1983 injury can be a complex inquiry. The inquiry is
complicated by the factual complexities inherent in a claim based
on an institutional "policy and practice" of a government entity,
rather than on direct malicious conduct by some individual "bad
actor." This article argues that the courts' rulings in two recent
that the limitations period runs from date when plaintiff received notice of termina-
tion of job appointment).
22. Cf. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). In Oliveri, the Second
Circuit recognized the access-to-information problem faced by plaintiffs and their at-
torneys, and held that plaintiffs need not secure detailed information otherwise neces-
sary to establish a pattern of actionable misconduct prior to commencement of an
action.
We recognize, however, that when commencing a [police misconduct] suit
... neither the plaintiff nor his attorney is likely to know much about the
relevant internal operations of the police department, nor about the discipli-
nary history and record of the particular police officers involved. In view of
the strong policies favoring suits protecting the constitutional rights of citi-
zens, we think it would be inappropriate to require plaintiffs and their attor-
neys before commencing suit to obtain the detailed information needed to
prove a pattern of supervisory misconduct in the form of inadequate train-
ing, improper policies, and toleration of unconstitutional actions by individ-
ual police officers.
Id. at 1279.
23. One scholar has commented on the difficulty prospective § 1983 plaintiffs have
in recognizing a claim. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1C,
§ 12.4.
The fact that a person knows (or should have known) of her injury, however, is not
the same as knowing that her federally protected rights were violated. A layperson
may well know that she has been injured, but it often takes a lawyer with expertise in
constitutional law to evaluate whether federally protected rights were violated. Id. at
10.
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cases, 24 decided in the Second Circuit, equating knowledge of indi-
vidual officers' illegal and corrupt conduct with knowledge of an
injury due to a municipality's policy, custom, or practice, are legally
and factually unsupportable. The approach taken by the courts,
this article argues, serves to diminish the effectiveness of § 1983
against municipalities.
This article further argues that a judge's determination of un-
timeliness is an inquiry based on objective facts and a judge's per-
ceptions, influenced by the judge's individual experiences, as well
as the dominant cultural norms of behavior as to what constitutes
reasonable actions and knowledge on the part of a plaintiff. Thus,
the limitations period calculation has an element of subjectivity, as
seen through the lens of a culturally normative reality.
The standard of accrual that determines the timeliness of a
§ 1983 claim is extremely malleable and vulnerable to an individual
judge's socially constructed cultural values. This standard of ac-
crual essentially renders § 1983 almost useless against municipali-
ties for police misconduct claims based on policies, practices, and/
or customs because it adopts a cultural standard at odds with a
racialized societal reality.25 Two recent Second Circuit cases26 are
analyzed to demonstrate the difficulty potential plaintiffs and their
counsel face in determining the point of accrual for Monell-based
claims alleging police misconduct.27
The City of New York (the "City"), the municipal defendant in
these two cases, challenged the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims
as untimely, arguing that they were filed after the three-year appli-
cable statutory time period.28 The City argued that plaintiffs had
notice of their municipal liability claims from statements made by
24. The two cases are Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), affd, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999), and
Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1999).
25. TWo commentators have asserted that § 1983 "is almost entirely a judicial con-
struct." Reshaping Section 1983, supra note 13, at 760.
26. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, affd, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999); Monzon,
1999 WL 1120527.
27. The author participated in the litigation of both cases in the district and circuit
courts. The author drafted the plaintiffs' memoranda of law in Clinton and Monzon
and the Clinton appellate brief. The author also argued the Clinton appeal before the
Second Circuit.
28. Section 1983 claims filed in New York are subject to New York State's three-
year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989); Murphy v. Lynn,
53 F.3d at 548 (2d. Cir. 1995); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2), (5) (McKinney 1990)
(state's three year limitations period applicable to general personal injury claims); see
also discussion infra Part I.
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state actors and the ensuing extensive media coverage underlying
the police precinct scandal.29 In addition, the City claimed that the
plaintiffs' participation in the investigation and prosecution of the
individual police officers involved in the plaintiffs' illegal arrests,
prosecutions, and incarcerations belied any claims that they did not
have notice of a municipal liability claim. 30  The plaintiffs re-
sponded that their municipal liability claims based on police mis-
conduct and corruption were timely filed because accrual did not
occur upon their initial arrests and prosecutions, but later, when
they knew that their injuries resulted from the City's policies rather
than from the individual police officers' actions.31 The plaintiffs
argued that information about the corruption and the City's direct
role in sustaining and furthering the corruption, was essential to
their notice of the municipal liability claim. 32
This article discusses the impact of the plaintiffs' testimony, offi-
cials' statements, and media coverage of the underlying events of
the claim and subsequent events on the accrual period of Monell-
based claims.3 3 Part I sets forth the applicable substantive and pro-
cedural law in determining the timeliness of a § 1983 municipal lia-
bility claim, and the rules governing summary dismissal based on
untimeliness. Part II discusses the two cases filed in the Southern
29. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
30. See Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion
to Dismiss at 4-7 & nn.5-6, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix at 52-55, Clinton v. City of
New York, No. 99-7336, (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Appendix]; New York
City Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 7-9, Monzon v. City
of New York, 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file
with author). See discussion infra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of the munici-
pal defendant's arguments.
31. It was critical to the plaintiffs' actions that the limitations period be calculated
from some point later than their arrests since both actions were filed more than three
years after the police arrested them. Clinton filed his complaint five years and eight
months after his arrest, and four years and eight months after being sentenced to four
years to life in prison. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 82-83. Monzon filed
his complaint six years after his arrest, and four years and three months after a jury
acquitted him of all charges. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dis-
miss, at 5-6, Monzon v. City of New York, 98 Civ 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Monzon's Memorandum].
32. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 89-91; Monzon's Memorandum, supra
note 31, at 10-17.
33. Portions of the discussions in Part II-IV of this article are adapted from the
author's memoranda of law and appellate brief filed in these cases.
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District of New York and the subsequent Second Circuit summary
order in one of these cases.
Part III considers the propriety of basing accrual of a § 1983 ac-
tion upon plaintiffs' testimony, the statements of state and local
law enforcement officials, and media coverage of municipal and
state employee actions. This section argues that the officials' state-
ments are insufficient as a matter of law, and that judicial reliance
upon them is in direct contravention of doctrine and precedent and
injects a contrarian analysis at odds with reality into § 1983 Monell-
based cases.
In addition, this section argues that reliance on "mainstream"
media coverage should be suspect because of its unreliability and
lack of credibility within communities suspicious of law enforce-
ment motives and actions. This section challenges the wisdom of
relying on mainstream English-language media coverage of police
misconduct in light of the often tortuous and hostile relationship
between law enforcement officials and people of color in general,
and between police and the specific communities at issue in the
litigation. The culturally and linguistically constructed normative
frameworks, as applied to Monell claims, are similarly discussed
and dissected.
Part IV discusses the equitable tolling arguments raised by the
plaintiffs and rejected by the courts. Part V recommends a stan-
dard for assessing "constructive knowledge" of § 1983 claims based
on state officials' statements and newspaper and other media cov-
erage. This part recommends that the courts adhere to a theory of
notice of a municipal liability claim built upon information con-
necting the municipal action to the plaintiff's injury, rather than
one based upon inferences about the connection between individ-
ual municipal actors and the municipality.
PART I
A. Limitations and Accrual Periods Applicable to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell Claims
In Wilson v. Garcia,34 the Supreme Court held that, for limita-
tions period purposes, § 1983 claims were analogous to personal
injury claims and thus subject to a state's personal injury statute of
limitations.35 Then, in Owens v. Okure,36 the Court held that when
34. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
35. Id. at 275-76.
36. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
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there are multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, § 1983
claims are subject to the state's general personal injury limitations
period.37 Owens involved New York State's statute of limitations,
and the Court concluded that New York's three-year general per-
sonal injury statute of limitations applied.38 The Court further held
that a § 1983 damages action on the grounds of "an unconstitu-
tional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction
or sentence has been invalidated. 3
9
Although § 1983 claims are subject to state statutory time limita-
tions they remain creatures of federal law and accrue pursuant to
federal law.4 ° The Supreme Court has determined that accrual oc-
curs when the claimant knew or "should have known of his in-
jury.''41 The circuits have uniformly adopted and applied this
standard to § 1983 claims.42
37. Id. at 249-50. For a table of state limitations periods applicable to § 1983
claims, including case citations, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
10, § 12.9, Table of Limitations Periods, & Supp. 2000.
38. 488 U.S. at 249-51; see also Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that the § 1983 statute of limitations in New York is three years); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 214(2), (5) (McKinney 1990). While § 1983 claims are subject to state stat-
utes of limitations, they are not subject to state notice-of-claim requirements. Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1988). Notice-of-claim requirements typically impose a
short time frame within which the prospective claimant must notify the government of
a potential lawsuit against public officers and/or public entities. For a discussion of
notice-of-claim requirements, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note
10, § 12.15.
39. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994).
40. See supra note 20.
41. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
42. Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (declaring the
standard is when plaintiff "knew or had reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of his action"); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1999) ("When a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Montgomery v. De Simone, PTL.,
159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[When] plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury which is the basis of the § 1983 action") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) ("When
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the ac-
tion.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz,
127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1997) ("When the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know,
of the injury on which the action is based.") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996) (when "plaintiff knows
or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has oc-
cuffed") (citation omitted); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 182
(4th Cir. 1996) ("[When plaintiff] knew or should have known both of the injury...
and who was responsible for any injury."); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561-62 (11th
Cir. 1996) ("[When] the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or
should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sellars v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th
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B. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) and Summary Judgment Motions Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for Untimely Actions
Municipalities commonly seek summary, pre-trial dismissal of
municipal liability claims. Accordingly, in Clinton v. City of New
York and Monzon v. City of New York, the City moved for dismis-
sal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,43 and, in Clinton, succeeded in dismissing the actions against
it before discovery under Rule 56.
Summary dismissal requires the defendant to satisfy a strict stan-
dard. A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
Cir. 1996) ("[When] plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of his action.") (citation omitted); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139,
1157 (2d Cir. 1995) ("When it is clear, or should be clear, that the harmful act [under-
lying the claim] is the consequence of a county 'policy or custom."'); Pauk, 654 F.2d
856, 859 (2d Cir. 1981) (when the claimant "knows or had reason to know" of the
injury) (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980)).
For a comprehensive discussion of § 1983 claim accrual, and a synopsis of signifi-
cant recent decisions on this issue, see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATIO N, supra
note 10, vol. 1C, § 12.4. As Professor Schwartz indicates, notice of injury and notice of
a constitutional violation are not the same. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court and a major-
ity of circuits adopted notice of injury, not notice of the violation of a right as the
accrual benchmark. Id. Yet, parties and attorneys have difficulty distinguishing these
two.
Basing accrual on notice of injury is problematic precisely because constitutional
issues are complex and difficult to grasp. Whether an individual has been injured in
the constitutional sense and the source of that injury are difficult to determine. Some
problems include the herculean task of discerning municipal liability when police de-
partments and cities deny the existence of a municipal role in the officers' "bad acts,"
arguing that the individuals involved are "rogue officers." Cf newspaper articles set
forth, infra notes 86-87 (referring to "rogue officers" in corruption scandals). Munici-
palities also withhold documentation and information that goes to the municipality's
role in the individual actions. E.g., King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 192 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (police departments refuse disclosure of personnel and investigatory files be-
cause it inhibits collection of information from police officers, and refuse disclosure of
police procedural guidelines because it compromises effectiveness of law enforce-
ment). Another layer of complexity to the legal and factual inquiry comes from § 1983
itself which, unlike other statutes, "does not create substantive rights." City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979)).
43. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1. In Monzon,
the municipal liability claim survived a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
because the court could not determine, as a matter of law, the untimeliness of the
plaintiff's claim. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527 at *1.
44. In Clinton, the court summarily dismissed, pursuant to Rule 56, concluding
that, on the record and under the law, the plaintiff was on notice beyond the time
when he filed his complaint. See infra Part II, for a discussion of the procedural his-
tory in these cases.
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of facts in support of [the plaintiff's] claim which would entitle [the
plaintiff] to relief."45 In considering the motion, the court must
treat all factual allegations as true and construe all reasonable in-
ferences in the plaintiff's favor.46
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate only where
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."'47 A party
seeking dismissal based on summary judgment faces a high thresh-
old. The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing "the
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. ' 48 Moreover,
the movant's summary judgment materials "must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the opposing party. '49 Satisfaction of the
moving party's burden is essential, because summary judgment
cannot be granted unless such burden has been adequately satis-
fied, even when the opposing party does not adequately respond.
"Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not
establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must
be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. 50
The district court's task in considering summary judgment is nar-
row. The district "judge's function is not.., to weigh the evidence
45. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For a comprehensive discussion of
the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and for citations to illustrative cases, see 2 JAMES WM
MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.); 5A
CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1355-1358 (West Publishing Co. 1990 & Supp. 2000).
The Second Circuit has stated that this "principle is to be applied with particular
strictness when the plaintiff complains of a civil rights violation." Branum v. Clark,
927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
46. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). See generally MOORE, supra note 45, § 12.34; WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 45, § 1357.
47. FED R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the Clinton litigation the City initially filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court treated as a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, based on the appended supporting doc-
uments submitted by both parties. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1. The parties' at-
tachments consisted of published and unpublished judicial opinions, New York State
and federal court documents in the referenced criminal matters involving the plaintiff
and the former police officer defendants, and plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to the
motion to dismiss. Appendix, supra note 30, 36-185.
48. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-33 (1986) (discussing Rule 56(e)). For a general discus-
sion of summary judgment and standards of review, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 45, vol. 10A, §§ 2716, 2728, & vol. 10B, § 2732.2; MOORE, supra note 45,
§ 56.11[5].
49. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted).
50. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendment (quoted
in Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160).
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and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. '51 Thus, the inquiry under sum-
mary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disa-
greement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. ''52 To that
end, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge .... The evidence of the non-mo-
vant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor. ' 5
3
On appeal, the appellate "[c]ourt reviews the district court's de-
termination de novo . . . and reviews facts in the light most
favorable to the losing party. ' 54 The court must be convinced that
there is no "evidence in the record from any source from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. ''5 5 Thus, summary judgment is limited to those cases in
which there are no disputed factual issues underlying a claim that
must be presented to a trier of fact.
C. Municipal Liability Claims
1. Pleading and Evidentiary Burdens
In Leatherman v. Tarrant,56 the Supreme Court rejected the ap-
plication of a heightened pleading requirement to § 1983 municipal
liability claims.57 The Court reiterated 8 that its reading of Rule
51. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Chambers
v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d. Cir. 1994) ("[A] court 'cannot try issues
of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be 'tried."') (citations omit-
ted); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (The
court is "carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of mate-
rial fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to
issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.").
For a general discussion of summary judgment and standards of review, see
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, vol. 10A, §§ 2716, 2728, & 10B, § 2732.2; MOORE,
supra note 45, § 56.11[5].
52. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
53. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-59).
54. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S.
911 (1998), Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1986)).
55. Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (citing Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211
(2d Cir. 1988)).
56. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
57. Id.
58. The Court's earlier reading of Rule 8(a)(2) is in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957).
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8(a)(2) requires "that a complaint include only 'a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief."' 59 However, the Court limited its decision in Leatherman to
municipal liability claims, and specifically left open the question
whether heightened pleading applies to claims against individu-
als.6" Section 1983 scholars have noted that following this decision,
several lower courts have preserved pleading hurdles that increase
the burden on prospective plaintiffs. 61 For example, some lower
courts have concluded that heightened pleading requirements are
still applicable to qualified immunity claims and conspiracy
claims.62
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear on
numerous occasions that municipal liability claims are independent
of individual claims and impose different evidentiary burdens on
the claimant.63 The standard for establishing a municipal policy or
custom places a significant burden on a claimant to establish that
the municipality itself has committed some act resulting in injury to
the claimant.64
59. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
60. Id. at 166-67; see SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, § 7.21
(discussing Leatherman).
61. For a comprehensive discussion of the pleading issues and court decisions
post-Leatherman, see NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 1:44-1.46;
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, §§ 1.6 -1.7.
62. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 1:44 (citing cases); SCHWARTZ, SEC-
TION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 1.6 (citing cases).
63. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); see also Pinaud v. County of Suffolk,
52 F.3d 1139 (2d Cir. 1995). See generally SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION,
supra note 10, §§ 7.7, 7.15-7.18.
In order to fully comprehend the Supreme Court's § 1983 case decisions, the
Court's construction of § 1983 must be considered in light of its application of com-
mon law tort doctrines to the statute. The Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)
(quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), and as a consequence, common law tort rules, "'defin-
ing the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the
appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well."' Id. (quoting Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978)). However, the Court has not uniformly applied
common law tort rules to § 1983, but rather has looked to such rules for guidance in
construing § 1983 in light of the statute's history and legislative goals. The prime ex-
ample of the Court's unwillingness to adopt whole-heartedly common law principles
is its rejection of a respondeat superior theory as applied to municipal liability claims
under § 1983. E.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
64. Indeed, plaintiff need not sue an individual to proceed on a municipal liability
claim. Only the municipality's policy, practice, or custom, which causes the violation
of the protected right, is needed to establish a municipal liability claim. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989); see Schwartz, Sec-
tion 1983 Claims, supra note 7, at 4.
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First, the plaintiff must assert a deprivation of a right protected
by the United States Constitution or a federal statute because
§ 1983 does not create "substantive rights; it merely provides reme-
dies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere."65 Second,
the municipality must have a policy that, as executed or imple-
mented, violates the claimant's rights.66 Such a policy may be
based upon either an official pronouncement or an act or series of
actions by municipal employees. 67 It may include a "policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by [the municipality's] officers, ' 68 those "edicts or
acts [that] may fairly be said to represent official policy," 69 or a
"governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not re-
ceived formal approval through the body's official decision making
channels."7 In his succinct summary of a plaintiff's available theo-
65. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816. (1985) (citing Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144, n.3 (1979) (holding that because police officers in-
flicted no constitutional injury to respondent, they were not liable under § 1983)); see
also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115 (1992) (holding that because
city's conduct did not violate the Due Process Clause, § 1983 did not provide a rem-
edy to municipal employer); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per
curiam); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615-20 (1979); Michael S.
Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983, in SWORD & SHIELD REVISITED: A PRAC-
TICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 215, 227 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983].
While the Court initially held in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1979), that
§ 1983 "laws" encompassed all statutory violations of federal law, it later significantly
limited that holding. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
28 (1981), the Court pronounced the standard for exceptions to § 1983 "laws" claims:
when a federal statute does not confer rights, privileges, or immunities enforceable
pursuant to § 1983, and when Congress foreclosed a private remedy by virtue of the
statute. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981), the Court stated that where a federal statute's remedies "are suffi-
ciently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to pre-
clude" § 1983 actions. See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 2:27-
2:37; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 4.2.
66. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A municipality may be liable for an actual policy,
its own direct acts or failure to train, or for actions so pervasive that they rise to the
level of a custom. See generally, NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 6:6-6:13,
6:33-6:34, 6:38-6:43.
67. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), the Court addressed the issue of which official could
be considered a decision-maker whose actions may be the basis for municipal liability.
The court concluded in these two cases that only actions attributable to those persons
who, under state law, have final policymaking authority could result in municipal lia-
bility. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82; Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124-27. See generally
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, §§ 7.8, 7.16-7.17.
68. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
69. Id. at 694.
70. Id. at 691.
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ries for the existence of a policy in satisfaction of the Court's pro-
nouncements, Justice Souter has stated that a policy may be
demonstrated:
[W]hen the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally
applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act com-
plained of is simply an implementation of that policy ....
... where no rule has been announced as a "policy" but fed-
eral law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself...
[such that] the choice of policy and its implementation are one
... [and] in a third situation, even where the policymaker has
failed to act affirmatively at all, so long as the need to take some
action to control the agents of the Government "is so obvious,
and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r] ... can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need."71
Third, the plaintiff must establish causation. There must be "a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. ' 72 The plaintiff must show that
the municipal policy "caused a constitutional tort. ' 73 A municipal-
ity is liable where its deliberate action is the "moving force" behind
71. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 417-18 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (third alteration in original). As Justice Souter recog-
nized, Monell is the classic example of the first theoretical matrix. The Clinton and
Monzon cases are examples of the third.
The number of acts necessary to give rise to a policy or custom continues to chal-
lenge courts and plaintiffs. One legal expert has stated, "there must be more than one
event to give rise to a custom or practice." Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983,
supra note 65, at 243. Further, "the practice must be 'longstanding' and 'pervasive."'
Id. A custom "must be persistent and well settled." NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 10, § 6:10; see Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 375, 385 (1989); see also City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (finding that the causation element of a § 1983 claims requires
the plaintiff to show (1) action by the city, rather than unilateral action by a non-
policy making employee, and (2) that "this policy or custom 'subjected' or 'caused
[plaintiff] to be subjected' to a deprivation of a constitutional right").
73. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The plaintiff cannot proceed under a theory of respon-
deat superior against the municipal defendant. Id. See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 10, 88 6:12-6:13, 6:35 (summarizing the law on causation, the con-
stitutional violation requirement, and the need for plaintiff to show a causal relation-
ship between the custom and the constitutional deprivation); SCHWARTZ, SECrION
1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, §§ 7.7, 7.12 (discussing whether plaintiff has to show
some level of fault in the municipality's adoption of the policy, and plaintiff's need to
show that the policy caused the constitutional deprivation).
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the plaintiff's injury.74 Lastly, the plaintiff must also establish cul-
pability of the municipality.75 Although § 1983 does not contain a
state of mind requirement, "[i]n any § 1983 suit ... the plaintiff
must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying
violation. '76 Section 1983 only requires a plaintiff to establish the
intent required for proof of the constitutional violation
In asserting a claim based on inadequate training, this last crite-
ria requires the plaintiff to establish that the municipality acted in a
manner that constitutes "deliberate indifference. ' 77 This standard
is "a judicial gloss, appearing neither in the Constitution nor in a
statute,' 78 and is an objective standard. Consequently, it is one of
the most difficult theories under which a plaintiff may proceed.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that municipal liabil-
ity based on a policy of inadequate training cannot be based on a
single incident of police misconduct.79 In contrast, § 1983 action
against an individual requires that the plaintiff show a violation of
a federal constitutional or statutory right, proximately caused by
the actions of a person acting under color of law.8°
2. Accrual: Question of Law, Fact, or Mixed?
The Second Circuit has stated that, in certain circumstances, the
determination of when a claim accrues involves "factual issues re-
lated to statute of limitations [which] should be put before a
jury."'81 Several lower courts in the Second Circuit have noted that
74. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
326 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992).
75. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 405; see also Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (finding no § 1983 liability where the harm to plaintiff was "too
remote a consequence" of the state action). The Court has stated that a § 1983 munic-
ipal liability claim is subject to a two part analysis: "(1) whether plaintiff's harm was
caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for
that violation." Collins, 503 U.S. at 120 (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 817).
76. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 405.
77. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388; see also Bogren, Municipal Liability Under § 1983,
supra note 65, at 249-53 (reviewing the deliberate indifference standard).
78. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994).
79. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821 (finding that a policy or custom of inadequate training
cannot be inferred from a single isolated incident of excessive force by a police of-
ficer, because such an inference would "allow a § 1983 plaintiff to establish municipal
liability without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal policy
maker").
80. SCHWARTZ, SECrION 1983 LITIGATION, supra note 10, vol. 1A, § 1.4, at 12.
81. Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
20001 523
524 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
the moment of accrual involves some factual determinations. 82 Ac-
cording to one Connecticut district court, the date when the claim
accrues for statutory limitations purposes "is ordinarily a question
of fact for a trier; consequently, a court cannot grant summary
judgment for a defendant if there is a genuine dispute as to when
the limitation period began."83 As stated in a decision from the
Northern District of New York, the determination of when there
are sufficient facts to give the claimant "reason to know ... of
defendants' actions, is a factual question that must be resolved by a
jury. "84
PART H
A. Police Corruption Within New York City's 30th Precinct85
In the early 1990s, police corruption of epic proportion en-
veloped the 30th Police Precinct in New York City.86 This corrup-
tion lasted several years and eventually led to the worst and most
pervasive police corruption scandal in the history of New York
City-an era marked by perjury, drug sales, extortion, and theft
committed by numerous police officers.87 The officers involved in
82. E.g., West Haven Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 721 F. Supp.
1547, 1555-56, n.10 (D. Conn. 1988); see also Paige v. Police Dep't, No. 97-CV-0455,
slip op. at 11 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998) (discussing whether certain facts provided a
basis for finding plaintiff had "constructive knowledge" of defendants' actions for
purposes of determining when action accrued is a factual question for the jury) (citing
Braune v. Abbott Laboratories, 895 F. Supp. 530, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)); JWP Inc. Sec.
Litig. v. Dwyer, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
83. West Haven Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. at 1556, n.10 (citations omitted); see also
Paige, No. 97-CV-0455, slip op. at 11 (discussing whether certain facts provided a basis
for finding plaintiff had "constructive knowledge" of defendants' actions for purposes
of determining when action accrued is a factual question for the jury).
84. Paige, No. 97-CV-0455, slip op. at 11-12 (citing Braune, 895 F. Supp. 530; JWP
Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239).
85. Attorneys of record for plaintiff in Clinton, Jose A. Muniz, Esq. and Rudy
Velez, Esq., provided valuable assistance and feedback in developing the factual
description of the 30th Police Precinct corruption scandal included in the plaintiffs'
memoranda of law, which the author wrote, and upon which the text herein is based.
86. David Kocieniewski, Victim of Framing by 2 Police Officers Wins $5,000 in
Payments from Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at B3 [hereinafter Victim of Fram-
ing]; David Kocieniewski, New York Pays a High Price for Police Lies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter New York Pays a High Price]; Andrew Jacobs, Bad
Cop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Bad Cop]; Clifford Krauss, 14 More
Officers Arrested at a Shaken 30th Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al [herein-
after 14 More Officers Arrested]; Peter Pringle, Police Close in on "Dirty 30," THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 25, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Police Close in].
87. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 102-03; see also Victim of
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the corruption acted both individually and with other members of
the precinct to steal drugs and stolen goods, and then to cover up
their actions by perjuring themselves before grand juries and in
court.88 The victims of this corruption were predominantly African
American and Latino.89
These actions were not aberrations, but were common occur-
rences perpetrated by a significant number of officers within the
precinct. According to one account, "one-sixth of the precinct's
officers had routinely stolen drug money, guns and cash." 90 Indeed,
the 30th Precinct gained the unique distinction of being known as
"the Dirty Thirty."' The corruption scandal in the 30th Precinct
was so pervasive and systemic that ultimately one-third of the pre-
cinct officials were implicated in the underlying illegal acts92 and
thirty-one police officials of the 30th Precinct were charged, con-
victed, or pleaded guilty.93
Framing, supra note 86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; George James, Officer Convicted of
Perjury in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at B6 [hereinafter Officer Con-
victed]; George James, Ex-Officer Tells Court of Protection and Pay Offs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1995, at B3 [hereinafter Ex-Officer Tells Court]; 14 More Officers Arrested,
supra note 86; Larry Elliot, New York Police Corruption Drive Extends its Inquiries,
THE GUARDIAN (London), May 9, 1994, at 12; Police Close in, supra note 86.
88. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
89. See New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note
86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
90. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
91. New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note 86;
Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
92. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103. The 30th Precinct corrup-
tion involved "every tour of duty," and resulted in thirty-one members from the pre-
cinct being charged "for involvement in narcotics distribution, thefts of money and
property, unlawful searches and seizures, the use of excessive force, extortion, income
tax evasion and perjury." Id. See generally New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86;
Victim of Framing, supra note 86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra
note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court, supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note
86; Police Close in, supra note 86; Clifford Krauss, More Officers Facing Arrest in
Corruption, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1994, at B1 [hereinafter More Officers Facing
Arrest].
93. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103.
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The corruption Was entrenched and covert, necessitating the par-
ticipation of several law enforcement entities in the investigation
and eventual elimination of the corruption. Beginning about May
1993, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, along with investi-
gators from the New York City Police Department's Internal Af-
fairs Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal
Investigation Division, the Mollen Commission (a New York City
commission established to investigate police corruption),94 and the
United States Attorney's Office, undertook a collective investiga-
tion into allegations of corruption in the 30th Precinct, including
charges of rampant false arrests and perjury committed by precinct
officials.95 Based on the revelations from their investigation, the
District Attorney's Office reviewed well over 500 criminal cases. 96
Many cases were dismissed and vacated due to the perjury and
wrongful actions of the 30th Precinct officers.97
Hundreds of persons, the majority of which were African Ameri-
can and Latino, were wrongfully incarcerated, prosecuted, and/or
convicted as a direct consequence of the officers' unlawful ac-
tions.98 This compromised the social contract, seriously breached
the trust of the communities most affected by the officers' actions,
namely the black and Latino communities, and undermined the
trust in the New York City Police Department. It also took a heavy
94. Former Mayor David Dinkins appointed the City of New York Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of
the Police Department to investigate police corruption allegations in New York City.
This commission, popularly known as the "Mollen Commission" after its chair, Judge
Milton Mollen, issued a report that concluded there was corruption throughout New
York City's Police Department. MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4.
95. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 103; More Officers Facing
Arrest, supra note 92.
96. Seth Faison, Case Review Under Way Due to Police In Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1994, at B2.
97. Letter from New York District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, by Assistant
District Attorney Emery E. Adoradio to United States District Judge Charles S.
Haight, Jr. (Feb. 26, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 118. The case
review was an enormous task, which the plaintiff in Clinton argued was incomplete.
Indeed, the plaintiff argued, upon information and belief, that there were still 1000-
2000 cases pending not yet dismissed by the City. Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810
(JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note
30, at 79.
98. See New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86; Victim of Framing, supra note
86; Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officer Convicted, supra note 87; Ex-Officer Tells Court,
supra note 87; 14 More Officers Arrested, supra note 86; Police Close in, supra note 86.
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toll on police resources and cost taxpayers millions of dollars in
litigation costs, awards, and settlements.99
Indeed, several victims sued officers and the City. Some filed
§ 1983 actions against those officers who were primary participants
in the 30th Precinct corruption. Reynaldo Clinton and Robert
Monzon were two of these victims.1°° They sued Edward Checke,
Kevin Nannery, Joseph Walsh, and James Velez.' A jury con-
victed Velez of various criminal counts. Checke, Nannery, and
Walsh pleaded guilty in both state and federal court.0 2 All four
were sentenced for crimes associated with their unlawful and cor-
rupt practices during their tour at the 30th Precinct. 3 Ironically,
because of their extensive participation in the police corruption
and conspiracy to violate the law, the cooperation of Checke, Nan-
nery, and Walsh was critical to the investigation and provided them
with the leverage to negotiate pleas for relatively short
sentences.' n
99. Victim of Framing, supra note 86 (reporting that the New York City Law De-
partment paid more than two million dollars in settlements with fifteen civil suits still
pending); New York Pays a High Price, supra note 86 (noting that awards and settle-
ments totaled 1.3 million dollars to date, and legal experts estimated such costs could
rise to ten million dollars); see also Neil MacFarquhar, Torture Case Puts Officers on
Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting that police credibility was "on
a knife edge in New York" due to police corruption and abuse); Jennifer Maddox,
Corrupt Police Taint Communities, THE STUART NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, at Cl (explain-
ing that police corruption "contaminate[s] relationship with communities"); Kevin
Johnson, New Breed of Bad Cop Sells Badge, Public Trust, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,
1998, at A8 (discussing several police corruption cases nationally and their impact on
society); MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at 4 (describing that perception of preva-
lence of police corruption and law enforcement's unwillingness to address this "poi-
sons relations between the community and the police").
100. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
101. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
102. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 80-81.
103. Checke, Nannery, and Walsh pleaded guilty in federal and state court to vari-
ous counts of conspiracy to violate civil rights, tax evasion, and first degree perjury.
These pleas were entered pursuant to their respective plea agreements with the prose-
cutors. Id. at 80-81.
104. On September 27, 1994, defendant Walsh pleaded guilty in federal court to
conspiracy to violate civil rights and to tax evasion. He also pled guilty to first degree
perjury in state court. Id. at 125. On November 15, 1994, defendant Nannery pled
guilty in federal court to conspiracy to violate civil rights and to tax evasion. He also
pled guilty in state court to first-degree perjury. Id. at 102. On February 2, 1996, de-
fendant Checke pled guilty in state court to first degree perjury. Id. at 110. Of these
defendants, Checke was the first sentenced, on April 9, 1996, in state court to a condi-
tional discharge. Checke Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at
137. Defendant Walsh was sentenced in federal court on April 2, 1997, to nine months
imprisonment and two years supervised release, and in state court to nine months
2000]
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For example, as part of the sentencing phase, the federal prose-
cutor in Nannery's case noted that:
[D]espite serious concerns about Nannery's abuse of his posi-
tion of trust and leadership within the [New York Police Depart-
ment], and the devastating consequences of his actions, both
[the United States Attorney's Office and the District Attorney's
Office] agreed that he was a critical witness who should be
signed up as a cooperator.
In sum, the gravity of the crimes committed by Kevin Nannery is
clear, and no amount of cooperation can change that. Neverthe-
less, Kevin Nannery's willingness to cooperate with this investi-
gation assisted in the prosecution of several additional corrupt
officers for which he deserves consideration at the time of
sentencing.' 0 5
The federal court sentenced Nannery to five months imprison-
ment and two years supervised release. 1°6
Similarly, with respect to Walsh, who was secretly arrested and
then cooperated by recording other former officers' statements
that resulted in their arrests,10 7 the prosecutor stated:
At the time, the Government was unaware of most of Walsh's
perjuries, and it is unlikely that the Government ever would
have learned of them had Walsh failed to divulge them volunta-
rily. This information was particularly important because it ena-
bled the District Attorney's Office, first, to immediately identify
and vacate legally-flawed prosecutions and, second, to bring
criminal charges against those officers who participated in the
perjuries.
imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Walsh Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Ap-
pendix, supra note 30, at 138-40; Ex-Officer Sentenced to 9-month Term, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 4, 1997, at 2. Defendant Nannery also was sentenced in 1997 in federal court to
five months imprisonment and two years supervised release, and in state court to one
to three years imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Nannery Sentencing Sheet,
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 141-44. The court sentenced James Velez to
several concurrent terms of one to three years incarceration.
In contrast, Reynaldo Clinton, the target and victim of Checke, Nannery, and
Walsh's corrupt actions, served almost two years in prison, more than any of the for-
mer police officers. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ.
3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra
note 30, at 5. Robert Monzon was wrongfully incarcerated and had to defend himself
at trial. Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1.
105. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 112.
106. Nannery Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 141-44.
107. Id. at 109, n.5.
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The gravity of the crimes committed by Joseph Walsh is clear,
and no amount of cooperation can change that. Nevertheless,
Joseph Walsh's willingness to cooperate with this investigation
assisted in the prosecution of several additional corrupt officers
for which he deserves consideration at the time of sentencing. 10
8
The federal court sentenced Walsh to nine months imprisonment
and two years supervised release. 10 9
B. Clinton v. City of New York: Factual and
Procedural Background
1. Reynoldo Clinton's Wrongful Arrest and Incarceration and
Participation in the Corruption Investigation
On or about September 29, 1992, former police officer Edward
Checke arrested Reynaldo Clinton."' Later, former police officer
Joseph Walsh falsely testified to the grand jury that he and former
police officer Kevin Nannery joined Checke in pursuing, appre-
hending, and recovering drugs from Clinton.' Clinton was subse-
quently indicted, convicted for possession of drugs, and sentenced,
on October 19, 1993, to an indeterminate prison sentence of four
years to life." 2
On November 4, 1994, pursuant to a motion for release under
New York's Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10,113 Clinton was re-
leased from prison after serving almost two years.114 The Supreme
Court of the State of New York vacated Clinton's wrongful convic-
tion and dismissed his unlawful indictment on December 13,
1994.115
108. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.
(Feb. 25, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 136.
109. Walsh Sentencing Sheet, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 138-40.
110. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
111. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 8;
Letter from New York District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, by Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney Emery E. Adoradio to United States District Judge Charles S. Haight,
Jr. (Feb. 26, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 116; Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
112. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999).
113. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1994).
114. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 5.
115. Id.
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In 1994 and 1995, representatives from the District Attorney's
Office approached Clinton regarding his arrest and the wrongful
acts of the arresting officers. 16 Assistant District Attorney Emery
E. Adoradio interviewed Clinton in the presence of his attorney
and confirmed information that officers involved in Clinton's pros-
ecution had lied to the grand jury.117 Clinton was later approached
again by the District Attorney's Office to recount his version of his
arrest to a grand jury, which he did in March 1995.11
2. Plaintiff Clinton's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Action
Clinton filed his amended complaint on June 16, 1998.119 He
charged defendants the City of New York, the New York City Po-
lice Department, and former police officers Walsh, Nannery, and
Checke, with federal and state civil rights violations arising from
his wrongful arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment. 20 Clinton's
claims were based on the illegal conduct and perjured testimony of
the officers, which, he alleged, were pursuant to an official custom
and practice permitting and facilitating such conduct.1 2 ' Specifi-
cally, Clinton alleged that the City was liable for official customs,
policies, and practices, and for failure to adequately select, hire,
train, supervise, and discipline the offices, all of which deprived
116. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra note 30, at 173.
117. Id.
118. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 146. The record is unclear and undeveloped
regarding the exact dates of these events. It appears that Adoradio's interview oc-
curred before December 10, 1994 and the grand jury testimony occurred in March
1995. This information is gathered from the joint appendix as cited supra note 30, and
from conversations between the author and the attorneys of record in the Clinton
litigation. Thus, it appears that Adoradio interviewed Clinton just two years after his
arrest and incarceration, and he testified before the grand jury on or about four
months after his release from jail, and two-and-a-half years after his arrest.
119. Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM),
1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 4.
120. Id. at 4-5.
121. Id. at 21-31. This article focuses solely on the municipal liability claims as-
serted against the City of New York and does not address the claims against the New
York City Police Department, because, under the laws of the state of New York, no
claims can lie directly against municipal departments, which are merely subdivisions
of the municipality and have no separate legal existence. Polite v. Town of Clarks-
town, 60 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing suit as to the town police
department); Hoisington v. County of Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (dismissing action as to the county department of social services, and citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which directs that federal courts must look to state law to
determine whether a government department may be sued).
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him of his rights and liberties, as guaranteed by'the United States
and New York Constitutions and federal and state laws.122
3. Procedural History
Clinton filed his action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, to redress the deprivation
under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, and us-
age of a right, privilege, and immunity secured to plaintiffs by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States. 3 The City moved to dismiss the municipal liability
claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the
grounds that Clinton's claim was statutorily time barred. 24
The district court treated the motion as a motion for summary
judgment, 25 which it granted in an unreported memorandum opin-
ion and order, dated March 1, 1999, dismissing Clinton's municipal
liability claim as time barred. 126 Clinton appealed, 27 and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an unpub-
lished summary order, filed October 29, 1999, for substantially the
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5.
124. The City and the Police Department jointly filed the motion to dismiss and, in
addition to raising the statutory time bar, argued that the entire complaint should be
dismissed because the state law claims were barred for failure to file a timely notice of
claim, the malicious abuse of process claim was insufficient on its face, and, with re-
spect to the Department, that the Department was not a proper party suable in this
action. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 50.
With respect to these arguments, the district court held that the state law claims
were barred for failure to file a notice of claim and that the claims against the individ-
ual former police defendants were statutorily time barred. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026,
at *2-3.
125. The district court concluded that both parties had submitted supporting docu-
ments to their papers on the motion to dismiss, and therefore accepted and reviewed
the documents, and converted the motion to a summary judgment motion under
F.R.C.P. 56. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
126. Id. at *3. The district court entered judgment granting defendants summary
judgment and dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice, on March 3, 1999.
127. Plaintiff appealed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as an appeal as of right from a
final decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiff raised the following issues: (1) whether the district court improperly
granted summary judgment and dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against The
City of New York as time barred; and (2) whether the district court improperly deter-
mined the date plaintiff's action accrued, based on statements set forth in an affirma-
tion by an assistant district attorney in plaintiffs criminal case, and based on media
coverage of various actions of New York Police Department and District Attorney's
Office officials. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, at 2, Clinton v. City of New York, No.
99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) (on file with author).
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same reasons set forth in the lower court's decision. 128 Pursuant to
the court's local rule and its pronouncement in the order, the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision has no precedential authority or other effect
beyond cases related to Clinton.129
C. Monzon v. City of New York: Factual and
Procedural Background
1. Plaintiff Robert Monzon's Wrongful Arrest and Prosecution
and Participation in the Corruption Investigation
On June 19, 1992, former 30th Precinct police officers James
Velez and Joseph Walsh arrested Robert Monzon.130 Monzon sub-
sequently was indicted and incarcerated for drug possession based
on their testimony. 31  Velez and Walsh falsely testified to the
grand jury, and at Monzon's trial, that they went to an apartment
128. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) (unpublished
summary order).
129. The Second Circuit's Local Rule § 0.23 states, in relevant part, that since state-
ments appended to summary orders "do not constitute formal opinions of the court
and are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited
or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court." In accordance
with this Rule, the Court's Clinton order states that it:
will not be published in the Federal Reporter and may not be cited as prece-
dential authority to this or any other court, but may be called to the atten-
tion of this or any other court in a subsequent stage of this case, in a related
case, or in any case for purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 1 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999). The
Rule has a longstanding history in the Second Circuit, following its adoption in 1973.
It survived a collateral attack in Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.
1983), and recently the Court applied this rule approvingly, reasserting the no-prece-
dential value prohibition, in Franceskin v. Credit Suisse, 214 F.3d 253, 256 n.1 (2d Cir.
2000).
For the first time, however, another circuit court recently struck down a strikingly
similar local rule, declaring it unconstitutional. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d
898 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eight Circuit's local rule provided that:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicata, collat-
eral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any un-
published opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court
if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published
opinion of this or another court would serve as well.
8TH CIR. R. 28A(i).
The Eighth Circuit found the rule "unconstitutional under Article III of the United
States Constitution, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that
goes beyond the 'judicial."' Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
130. Complaint paras. 8-9, 11, 14-15, Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872
(LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Monzon Complaint].
131. Id. paras. 16-18.
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in Manhattan in response to a call about a fight in the apartment.132
They claimed that they found Monzon, and recovered a bag of co-
caine, which they falsely alleged was in plain view. 133 The jury ac-
quitted Monzon of all charges on April 19, 1993. TM
As a consequence of the 30th Precinct's investigation, Walsh was
arrested on June 6, 1994, and thereafter implicated several other
officers from the precinct in charges of corruption and perjury, in-
cluding defendant Velez for his involvement in the wrongful arrest
and prosecution of Monzon. 35 Walsh admitted that he and Velez
had falsely arrested and lied about Monzon. 136 Walsh pled guilty as
part of an agreement with prosecutors, but defendant Velez went
to trial in state court where he was convicted on various counts of
perjury.137
The New York District Attorney approached Monzon and his
trial attorney on April 26, 1996, regarding the need for Monzon to
testify at defendant Velez's criminal trial. 38 Monzon and Walsh
both testified against Velez, and a jury convicted him on May 2,
1996, of numerous criminal counts. The court subsequently sen-
tenced Velez to several concurrent terms of one to three years
incarceration. 139
2. Plaintiff Monzon's 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Civil Rights Action
Robert Monzon filed a § 1983 action on July 9, 1998, against the
individual officers and the City of New York. 4 ° He alleged that
the defendants were responsible for his wrongful arrest, incarcera-
tion, and his prosecution secured as a result of the illegal conduct
and perjured testimony of the former police officers, now individ-
ual defendants. 141 He further alleged that the City of New York
was liable for official customs, policies, and practices, and for fail-
ure to select, train, supervise, and discipline officers and supervi-
132. Id. paras. 13, 18.
133. Id. paras. 11-20.
134. Id. para. 20.
135. Id. paras. 21-26.
136. Id. paras. 25-26.
137. Id. paras. 22-24, 28-29; Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 6.
138. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130 para. 28. This conversation occurred three
years and ten months after Monzon's arrest, and just one week short of three years
after his acquittal on all charges. Monzon filed his complaint less than three years
after the district attorney approached him.
139. Id. para. 29.
140. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130. The complaint also listed as a defendant
the New York City Police Department.
141. Id. para. 1.
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sors, which deprived him of his rights and liberties as guaranteed
by the United States and New York Constitutions and federal and
state laws. 14 2
3. Procedural History
Defendant City of New York moved to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, on the grounds that Monzon's § 1983 and pendant
state claims were statutorily time barred. 4 3 On December 6, 1999,
the district court denied the City's request to dismiss Monzon's
Monell claim.'
D. Municipal Defendant's Motions to Dismiss
As discussed above, the City of New York filed motions to dis-
miss in both the Clinton and Monzon lawsuits. 45 Both motions
asserted various grounds for dismissals of the complaints. 46 With
respect to the municipal liability claims, the City claimed that they
were time barred, and raised two primary bases in each case: first,
that the plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of their Monell-
based claims, at the latest, in Clinton's case, upon the vacatur of his
conviction, '14 and in Monzon's case, upon his acquittal; 148 and sec-
ond, that the 30th Precinct corruption scandal was sufficiently pub-
licized so as to give plaintiffs notice of their alleged municipal
liability claims more than three years prior to the filing of their
respective complaints. 49
142. Id. paras. 41-44.
143. New York City Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Monzon v. City of New York, 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
7, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter City's Monzon Memorandum].
144. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
145. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
146. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *1; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527, at *1.
147. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 52-55; Municipal Defendants' Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix,
supra, note 30, at 190-95. The City filed its motion and supporting papers on behalf of
the City of New York and the New York City Police Department. Municipal Defend-
ants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, reprinted in Ap-
pendix, supra, note 30, at 50.
148. City's Monzon Memorandum, supra note 143 at 7-8.
149. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 54, 192-95; City's Monzon Memo-
randum, supra note 143 at 8-9.
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1. Clinton Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment Motion
In the Clinton case, the City argued specifically that, under the
law, Clinton was on notice of his claim when the New York court
vacated his conviction. The City argued that in accordance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey,150 a § 1983
claim accrues when "the prosecution terminates in [the plaintiff's]
favor. "151
Clinton responded that because Heck determined accrual for
§ 1983 claims based on an unconstitutional conviction or sentence,
it did not apply to his Monell claim.' 52 The Monell claim is based
on actions of the municipal defendants, as well as those of the indi-
vidual officers, a fortiori, he could not be aware of an official pol-
icy, custom and/or practice, at the time that his conviction was
vacated.
Unlike the claims in the cases subject to the decision in Heck,
the claims against the moving defendants are not based solely
on the specific actions directly leading to the unlawful convic-
tion, rather plaintiff has alleged various actions by the moving
defendants, apart from the actions of the former police officers
involved in his arrest, that support a municipal liability claim.
Thus, the accrual of this claim cannot be measured by the date
of his release from prison or of the vacatur of his conviction. It
must be measured, as [the Second] Circuit has stated, time and
time again, when the claimant "knew or had reason to know of
his injury," and in the case of a Monell claim, this cannot be
"inferred from a single incident of illegality, such as a first false
arrest or excessive use of force, absent some additional
circumstances. ,153
Clinton argued alternatively that, should the court conclude that
the three-year limitation period had expired prior to his filing of
the complaint, the court should toll the statute of limitations under
equitable tolling principles.154 He maintained that he was entitled
to the benefit of equitable tolling because the individual defendant
ex-police officers' "unlawful and fraudulent conduct concealed the
basis of [his] cause of action, and the municipal defendant's custom
150. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
151. Municipal Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to
Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 52.
152. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Clin-
ton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,
1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 87-88.
153. Id. at 88 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id.
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and practice and ensuing investigation further obscured informa-
tion necessary to form the requisite knowledge of the claim. 155
In response, the City argued that Clinton had particular knowl-
edge at the time of the vacatur which put him on notice.156 Specifi-
cally, the City cited to an affirmation of Assistant District Attorney
Emory Adoradio, dated two years after Clinton's arrest and filed in
support of the vacatur.15 7 The affirmation asserted that during the
course of Adoradio's investigation into allegations of corruption in
the 30th Precinct, he obtained information that Clinton's arrest and
evidence in his case were fabricated. 158 The affirmation asserted
that Clinton corroborated this information during the Adoradio's
interview of Clinton, in the presence of Clinton's defense
attorney. 159
The City also argued that Clinton's testimony about his arrest,
presented shortly after the vacatur in a grand jury proceeding
against defendant Checke, and a March 1995 news article naming
Clinton, were further evidence of information which put him on
notice of the precinct corruption. 160
The City further cited the "well-publicized nature of the 30th
Precinct scandal, ' 161 as an additional basis in support of its argu-
ment that Clinton should have been on notice of his Moneil claim
more than three years prior to the filing of his complaint.
On the equitable estoppel issue, the City argued that it had not
concealed "a single relevant fact" from Clinton,162 and that regard-
less, he was not entitled to have the statute of limitations tolled,
because any fraud by the 30th Precinct officers could not preclude
discovery of Clinton's harm.
163
155. Appendix, supra note 30, at 94-96.
156. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 192-93.
157. Id. at 192 (citing Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10,
1994), reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173-74).
158. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173, para. 3.
159. Id. at 173, para. 4.
160. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 193.
161. Id.
162. Municipal Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Mo-
tion to Dismiss, reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 195.
163. Id. at 196 (relying on precedent in Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327
(2d Cir. 1982)).
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a. The District Court's Decision
The district court concluded that the municipal liability claim
was untimely because it was filed more than three years after the
dismissal of Clinton's indictment. 164 The court agreed with the City
that the Assistant District Attorney's affirmation put Clinton on
notice of his claim.' 65 In support of its conclusion, the court found
that the inclusion of the 30th Precinct scandal in the Mollen Com-
mission's Report, as well as the extensive newspaper and cable net-
work coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal, should have put him
on notice of his claim.' 66 The court was further persuaded on the
notice issue by the fact that Clinton testified before the grand jury
against arresting officer Checke-"a process that should have
made the viability of his claim obvious.' '167
The court refused to toll the statute of limitations, concluding
that the City was innocent of any wrongful concealment. Instead,
the court concluded that any efforts to conceal the nature of the
wrongdoing were conducted by the individual officers, not the
City.168 The court noted that the City had not taken any steps to
conceal the officers' actions except those necessary to the integrity
of an investigation, and had taken "affirmative steps" to inform
Clinton "of the circumstances surrounding his arrest" by having
him testify to a grand jury.169
b. The Second Circuit Decision
On appeal, Clinton argued that the information about the indi-
vidual former police officers' actions, advanced by the City and im-
puted to him, could not, by itself, place him on notice of a Monell
policy and practice claim as a matter of law. 170 Clinton stressed the
lack of factual information in the record presented by the City to
support dismissal of the claim.' In particular, Clinton challenged
164. Clinton v. City of New York, No. Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).




169. Id. at *2.
170. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 24-25, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-
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the legal and factual significance of the Adoradio affirmation,
which had been central to the district court's decision. 172
In his brief to the court of appeals, Clinton argued that the affir-
mation did not provide any new information, other than the fact
that in December 1994 an assistant district attorney was investigat-
ing allegations of police corruption in the 30th Precinct.173 Clinton
vigorously argued that such information could not be the basis for
notice of his Monell claim.174 First, the affirmation was dated two
years after his arrest.1 75 Second, it did not contain any reference to
the dates and timeframes of the allegations nor investigation of
corruption in the 30th Precinct. 176 Third, the affirmation did not
reveal any new information to put Clinton on notice of his Monell
claims. Clinton's brief states:
[Plaintiff] was well aware prior to the filing of this Affirmation
that the police had fabricated evidence and lied; [Plaintiff] knew
he was innocent, so that this information could not alert him to
anything more than he already knew. This information was
about the culpability of individual officers. Such information
cannot be the basis for alerting him to a municipal liability
claim,'
77
Clinton also challenged the significance of the media coverage of
the 30th Precinct scandal and the doctrinal foundation for adopting
a per se rule on the sufficiency of such coverage as a matter of
law. 178 Clinton asserted that if news coverage of the scandal were
considered in determining the moment of accrual of his § 1983 mu-
nicipal liability claim, various thorny factual issues would arise.'79
For example, there were questions about Clinton's awareness of
the news, including the content of articles and news announce-
ments, that were beyond the scope of the motion and the district
court's authority. 8 °




174. Id. at 25.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 26.
177. Id. at 24-25.
178. Id. at 27-29.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 27-28.
181. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 3 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999)
(on file with author).
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2.. Monzon Motion to Dismiss
a. The Parties' Arguments
In Monzon, the City asserted the same arguments regarding the
timeliness of the Monell claim that it had raised in the Clinton case.
In fact, it relied on the district court's decision in Clinton to support
its argument that the publicity from the 30th Precinct scandal put
Monzon on notice. 182
Monzon asserted the same counter-arguments raised in Clin-
ton. 83 He argued additionally that his limited English language
skills left an issue of fact for the jury concerning what he should
have known based on media coverage of the scandal.1 4
b. The District Court's Decision
On December 6, 1999, the district court denied the City's request
to dismiss the municipal liability claim. 185 The court concluded that
it could not decide as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
"that plaintiff was, or should have been, aware that he had a Mo-
nell claim prior to April of 1996 when he was contacted by the
District Attorney's Office to testify against one of the individual
defendants.' 1 86 The court further concluded that an issue of fact
existed as to whether newspaper reports put Monzon on notice of
this claim. 187 The parties eventually settled the case. 188
PART III
The premise of the Second Circuit and Southern District of New
York decisions in Clinton is that Clinton's testimony in an investi-
gation of an individual police officer, statements of an assistant dis-
trict attorney, and news coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal
provided Clinton with sufficient information, at the time that the
182. City's Monzon Memorandum, supra note 143, at 7-9.
183. The Plaintiff urged the court to reject Judge Martin's decision and reasoning in
Clinton. Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31, at 20.
184. Id.
185. Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527. The district court granted the motion to dismiss




188. The parties settled for $60,000. Letter from Jose A. Muniz to New York City
Corporation Counsel (July 11, 2000) (accepting $60,000 settlement offer on plaintiff's
behalf) (on file with author); Stipulation Discontinuing Action (July 11, 2000),
Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
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New York courts vacated his conviction, to put him on notice of his
Monell claims. 18 9 The underlying ruling is that notice of the cor-
ruption is notice of the injury caused by the City's policy, practice,
or custom. A careful review of the case and the judicial analysis
adopted by the courts reveals various legal and practical shortcom-
ings to this approach.
While Clinton did indeed testify before a grand jury just over
three years before filing his complaint, that testimony in no way
implicated the municipal liability claims. As far as the court record
shows, Clinton testified solely about the events surrounding his ar-
rest. Clinton merely repeated that he was wrongfully arrested by a
police officer. This testimony was used to substantiate the prosecu-
tion's charge that the arresting officer, Edward Checke, had per-
jured himself when he testified against Clinton before a grand jury
in Clinton's criminal action, and that he provided a factually inac-
curate account of Clinton's arrest. 190
Similarly, the Assistant District Attorney's affirmation is legally
insufficient to support summary dismissal of the complaint. The
affirmation's contents may be distilled into three essential pieces of
information. First, Assistant District Attorney Adoradio was in-
vestigating allegations of police corruption in the 30th Precinct.1 9'
Second, during his investigation Adoradio learned through cooper-
ating police officers that fabricated evidence was used in plaintiff's
arrest.192 Third, that Adoradio's interview with plaintiff, in the
presence of plaintiff's counsel, corroborated the cooperating police
officers' information.193 Again, these statements do not implicate
the municipality.
The news accounts focused on the individual officers in the pre-
cinct. Throughout these accounts, the law enforcement investiga-
tion and arrests are mentioned. 194 Some of the news articles were
189. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1999);
Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
190. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 146, para. 8; Indictment in People v. Clinton,
reprinted in Appendix, supra, note 30, at 147-54.
191. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 173-74.
194. See supra notes 86-87, for newspaper coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal and
investigation.
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published prior to the invalidation of Clinton's conviction and sub-
sequent release from prison. 195
While the district court in Monzon reached a different conclu-
sion on the notice question, the court's analysis mirrors the analy-
ses in the Clinton decisions. The district court in Monzon
determined that it could not conclude that the plaintiff received
notice of his Monell claim prior to when the District Attorney's
Office contacted him to testify against one of the police officers
named as a defendant in Monzon's case. 96 The court concluded, a
fortiori, that once the plaintiff was contacted to testify, he was on
notice of his Monell claim. The court appears to have applied the
same analyses as the district and Second Circuit courts in
Clinton.19
7
Neither the law nor the facts, however, support the analytic ap-
proach adopted in these cases. The plaintiffs' testimony before
grand juries and at trial, the district attorney's statements, and the
news media accounts do not provide specific information about
anything other than the respective individual police officers' bad
acts. As a consequence, they do not prompt inquiry or raise the
specter of concern that would put either plaintiff on notice to con-
sider a possible action against the City of New York, the entity that
must have acted directly against the plaintiff. This is particularly
relevant in police misconduct cases where target communities, spe-
cifically communities of color, are exposed daily to police abuse
and intrusion. As a result, these "accounts" are of dubious value as
the bases for judging the accrual period for the municipal liability
claim. Moreover, in the context of a motion to dismiss or a sum-
mary judgment motion, where factual issues are beyond the pur-
view of the trial judge, whether news coverage should have put the
plaintiff on notice is solely for the jury to decide.
195. In fact, the City in Clinton submitted two such articles. Appendix, supra note
30, at 176-81.
196. The court concluded that:
While plaintiff may have had notice that the felony complaint and the grand
jury and trial testimony against him were false more than three years prior to
the filing of the present complaint, the Court cannot find as a matter of law
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that plaintiff was, or should have been, aware that
he had a Monell claim prior to April of 1996 when he was contacted by the
District Attorney's Office to testify against one of the individual defendants.
Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
197. Compare Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL
1120527 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999), with Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336 (2d
Cir. Oct. 29, 1999), and Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999
WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
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The courts' analyses and reasoning in both cases is evaluated in-
fra from three different legal vistas within the courts' tri-issue
framework, dividing the analyses into the plaintiffs' testimony,
state officials' statements, and media coverage of the precinct scan-
dal. I address the doctrinal limits of the courts' decisions and
methodology. Specifically, I analyze the manner in which the anal-
ysis fails to comport with the theoretical engine driving the Su-
preme Court's decision in Monell. I also discuss the decisions' lack
of adherence to circuit precedent on the legal standard applicable
to accrual questions in municipal liability cases. I dissect the fac-
tual basis for the decisions, concluding that the facts in the record
fail to support the Clinton courts' conclusions that he was on notice
more than three years prior to filing his complaint. Lastly, I raise
the issue of the courts' silence on the racialized context in which
these cases arise.
A. Plaintiff's Testimony and Law Enforcement
Officials' Statements
The Clinton and Monzon courts' consideration of the plaintiffs'
testimony against individual police officer defendants, and the
courts' reliance in Clinton on the Assistant District Attorney's af-
firmation, does not adhere to the Supreme Court's doctrinal and
theoretical interpretation of municipal liability pursuant to § 1983.
1. Doctrinal Deficiencies and Weaknesses
To be on notice of a municipal liability claim, the plaintiff must
be on notice of the injury and that the municipality's policy, prac-
tice, or custom is the source of that injury in the legal sense. 198
Thus, to be on notice of a municipal liability claim is to be on no-
tice of the municipal actor's direct role in the plaintiff's injury, vis-
A-vis a municipal policy, practice, or custom. After all, "Monell
[was] a case about responsibility." 199 This approach to the notice
question is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of local government liability under § 1983. Simple causation
based on the municipality's position as employer is insufficient be-
cause respondeat superior is not an available liability theory
against a municipality.200 For liability to accrue, the municipality
198. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995).
199. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986).
200. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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must cause the injury through enforcement or implementation of
its policies, practices, and/or customs.20 1
Yet the court's decision in Clinton circumvents Monell by con-
cluding that a plaintiff would be on notice of a legal claim when the
plaintiff learns that the state is prosecuting individual officers and
investigating police corruption. This analysis assumes that the
plaintiff will become aware of a municipal liability claim, which
must be based on institutional wrongdoing via enforcement of
some policy, simply by learning that officers are being prosecuted
for their actions and that the state is investigating claims of police
corruption.2 o2
This analysis fails to consider the requirement of institutional
malfeasance, which is direct municipal action that holds a munici-
pality accountable for those policies that are "the moving force of
the constitutional violation, 20 3 not for the mere bad acts of its em-
ployees or representatives. Nevertheless, these decisions have
turned what had been a clearly understood doctrine of direct liabil-
ity on its head. It appears that in the Second Circuit, a municipality
is not liable for the actions of its tortfeasor employee under a the-
ory of respondeat superior in accordance with Monell, and a mu-
nicipality may also rely on the principle of respondeat superior 20 4
as a procedural time bar against a § 1983 municipal liability claim.
Thus, a municipality has the best of both worlds. First, the doctrine
is a substantive shield, because the municipality is protected from
liability for police officers' acts absent some policy; second, the
doctrine serves as a procedural sword, because the theory is availa-
ble to the defendant in asserting the proper time for accrual of the
claim and notice to the plaintiff.
Clearly, the Supreme Court did not intend, nor expect, that "a
local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury in-
flicted solely by its employees or agents. '20 Nor did it intend that
a plaintiff would be responsible for determining that a municipal
policy caused or allowed the employee or agent to inflict injury on
201. Id. at 690.
202. This appears counterintuitive since it would be more difficult to establish lia-
bility where the municipality is indeed responding to individual officers' illegal actions
by investigating and prosecuting these "bad actors."
203. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
204. "The doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or
agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
205. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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the plaintiff, without direct information about a municipal policy
and its connection to the employee's acts.
A plaintiff's testimony about an individual police officer's bad
acts that caused the plaintiff's injuries is merely an articulation of
information the plaintiff had at the time the injury occurred. For
example, testimony that the officer lied about the plaintiff does not
demonstrate knowledge of an institutional policy, practice, or cus-
tom. Therefore, it cannot be sufficient notice to toll the statute.
Although both Clinton and Monzon knew that they were innocent
and that the officers involved in their arrests had lied, this does not
establish that an individual was on notice of a possible claim. In
Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, the Second Circuit recognized that
such information does not necessarily place a plaintiff on notice
that a municipal policy was the cause of the injuries.2 °6
Indeed, an opposite approach ignores the reality of police mis-
conduct victims who are disproportionately black and Latino. For
these individuals, police misconduct, especially law enforcement in-
trusion into their daily lives, is so commonplace as to be expected.
As such, the actions of the police in Clinton and Monzon, and
within the 30th Precinct where police targeted African Americans
and Latinos, for example, are viewed as typical of the institutional
racism which pervades society. While society at large may view
such actions as aberrations, and appear surprised or shocked by
police misconduct, people of color this as "business as usual" by
the police.
The Assistant District Attorney's affirmation in Clinton was also
legally insufficient to put a plaintiff on notice. Nothing in the affir-
mation suggests, or otherwise would lead Clinton to inquire about,
the existence of a City policy-in the form of an official statement,
a policymaker's acts, or some custom-which caused Clinton's in-
juries.2 7 The affirmation only states that the Assistant District At-
206. 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995).
207. This is particularly inappropriate with respect to New York City's Police De-
partment, which has been the target of numerous claims of corruption and police
abuse and historically has denied institutional malfeasance and wrongdoing. E.g.,
MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-9, 51-69, 90-101, 107-09 (detailing history of cor-
ruption in New York City, police culture which minimizes and conceals corruption,
and Police Department's failure to hold police accountable, but also recognizing that
the vast majority of officers are honest); City of New York Office of the Mayor, Exec-
utive Order No. 42 (July 24, 1992), 1992 N.Y. LEGIS. SERV. 330 (establishing Mollen
Commission, in part, so that "the misdeeds of a few must not be allowed to sully or
taint the reputations and sacrifices of the vast majority of honest and dedicated men
and women who serve on the police force"); Clifford Krauss, 2-Year Corruption In-
quiry Finds a 'Willful Blindness' in New York's Police Dept.: Mollen Report Blames
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torney was "presently investigating allegations of police corruption
in the 30th Precinct in Manhattan. '20 8 Indeed, a careful reading of
the affirmation suggests that the affirmation could, by its own
words, lead the plaintiff to believe that the Assistant District Attor-
ney's then-current investigation did not encompass events of the
past two years. In fact, it suggests that the Assistant District Attor-
ney's discovery of information about Clinton's case was an unfore-
seen and unrelated result of the Assistant District Attorney's
investigation. The affirmation states:
During the course of this investigation, I learned through coop-
erating police officers formerly assigned to the 30th Precinct
who were participants in the arrest of Reynaldo Clinton that the
circumstances leading to the arrest of defendant and recovery of
narcotics from his car had been fabricated by the police.20
9
The City's own historical rejection and dismissal of reports con-
cluding that the Police Department and the City have encouraged
and facilitated the very conduct that flourished in the 30th Precinct
further support this interpretation,210 which is just as likely to be
accurate as the claim that this put the plaintiff on notice. On a
motion to dismiss, where there is some equipoise in the possible
readings of the parties' arguments, the court should conclude that
the movant has failed to satisfy the burden of showing that the
plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the plaintiff's
claim.
Gap in Responsibility for Rogue Officers, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at Al; KNAPP
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (finding widespread police corruption). See generally NEW
YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS 1894-1994 (Gabriel J.
Chin ed., W.S. Hein 1997) (1895).
208. Affirmation in Support of Dismissal of Indictment (Dec. 10, 1994), reprinted in
Appendix, supra, note 30, at 173.
209. Id.
210. E.g., David Kocieniewski, Bratton Challenges Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1996, at B4 (reporting that Police Commissioner Bratton "rebutted a rogue police
officer's court testimony that the 30th Precinct's rampant corruption was encouraged
and initiated by the precinct's two top commanders"); cf. MOLLEN REPORT, supra
note 4, at 13 (characterizing New York City Police Department approach to investiga-
tions of allegations of corruption as a narrow focus on the single corrupt cop as the
"rotten apple," rather than on patterns of wrongdoing); id. at 70-71 ("[T]he New York
City Police Department had largely abandoned its responsibility to police itself and
had failed to create a culture dedicated to rooting out corruption... [due to] a deep-
seated institutional reluctance to uncover serious corruption.. . ."); COMMISSION TO
COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 4 (finding, based on a study of disciplinary
cases in 1994-96, penalties were in many cases grossly inadequate).
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2. The Legal Standard
The courts' decisions are also counter to Supreme Court and
Second Circuit precedent in police misconduct cases regarding the
quantum of information necessary to provide notice of municipal
liability. The initial inquiry into notice of an injury caused by a
municipal policy is inextricably linked to the inquiry into the level
of evidence necessary to establish the necessary proof of such pol-
icy. Although the plaintiff's complaint must contain only a prop-
erly pleaded claim, 11 the Second Circuit's and the Southern
District's courts' decisions appear to impose an additional pre-fil-
ing burden similar to truncated discovery.
Consider the typical case of an individual who is physically in-
jured, or whose constitutional rights are otherwise violated, by a
single action of a police officer or some other municipal officer.
Such a plaintiff would face a tremendous challenge and significant
burden of proof in establishing that a single incident can lead to an
inference of a municipal policy.212
Supreme Court precedent in this area is convoluted. In
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,213 a plurality of the Court stated that"where the policy ... is not ... unconstitutional, considerably more
proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to
establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality...
and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitu-
tional deprivation. '214 Yet, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,215 a
plurality of the Court held that a municipality could be liable
where an official policy-maker's single decision results in a consti-
211. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
212. For a discussion of municipal liability based on a single bad act of the police,
see Adam S. Lurie, Ganging Up on Police Brutality: Municipal Liability for the Un-
constitutional Actions of Multiple Police Officers Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2087 (2000).
213. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
214. Id. at 824 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Three other Justices
agreed that a single incident of excessive use of force by a police officer would be
insufficient to establish a municipal policy. Id. at 833 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). Although a
majority of the Court in Tuttle could not agree as to the viability of a § 1983 claim
based on inadequate training, the Court subsequently unanimously recognized such a
claim, albeit subject to a higher threshold of proof. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 375, 388 (1989), the Court held that municipal liability may be imposed "where
the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact."
215. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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tutional violation.216 This is far from recognizing that the actions of
a police officer without such policy-making authority could be con-
strued as a municipal policy, however. Only in City of Canton v.
Harris,217 a failure to train case, has the Court suggested that a
single incident could permit an inference of a municipal policy. In
City of Canton, the Court imposed a high threshold of misconduct
for municipal liability, requiring that the municipality act with "de-
liberate indifference" of the rights of the individual.218
Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of what may con-
stitute a municipal policy for § 1983 purposes, the individual de-
scribed in the above hypothetical could not proceed on a municipal
liability claim against the government. A claim based on a single
action invites summary dismissal for legal insufficiency on the face
of the complaint, or as factually unsubstantiated. Although a sin-
gle incident may be sufficient for a failure to train claim, the plain-
tiff in such a case must establish deliberate indifference, a
particularly onerous burden of proof. Where such a claim is
against a municipality for the actions of its police, the claim almost
takes on an "enhanced deliberate indifference burden" because of
the police "code of silence. '21 9 This code makes it extremely diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to procure information regarding individual po-
lice officials' actions and how they relate to police policy, customs,
and/or practices because officers do not speak out about corrup-
tion. However, as one court in the Eastern District of New York
has stated, the existence of such code may be the basis for a failure
to train or supervise claim since adequate supervision may avoid
deprivation of protected rights.22°
Initially, it may appear that the Clinton and Monzon cases fall
within the category of claims which may proceed based on a single
incidence because both complaints charged the City with liability
for failure to adequately select, hire, train, supervise, and disci-
216. Id. at 480.
217. 489 U.S. 378.
218. Id. at 388.
219. Ariza v. City of New York, No. CV-93-5287, 1996 WL 118535, at *2-3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996) (citing a report by the Mollen Commission describing a
"Code of Silence," or "Blue Wall of Silence," that shields corrupt officers by discour-
aging honest police officers from reporting corruption).
220. Id. at *5-6 (finding that, in a police officer's complaint against the New York
City Police Department for a § 1983 violation of his freedom of speech, a code of
silence was evidence of deliberate indifference to his constitutional right by failure to
adequately train or supervise employees).
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pline.221' However, Clinton and Monzon involved clearly illegal
acts by police officers that are not easily or directly connected to
the types of municipal actions which are the basis for liability under
Monell. The police officers' fabrication of evidence and perjury are
not executions of an official policy, ordinance, or regulation. Nor
are they actions representative of a municipal custom or practice
within the "failure to train" category because they are single ac-
tions not obviously attributable to a municipality's training proto-
col. This is not to say that plaintiff could not prove that the actions
are attributable to municipal policy, or custom, but for purposes of
notice of a municipal liability claim, the individual officers' actions
do not resoundingly fall within a category of conduct which should
place a plaintiff on notice of a legally cognizable municipal liability
claim.222
The Second Circuit recently articulated the nuanced difference
in this type of case in Walker v. City of New York,223 which involved
a claim against the City of New York for failure to train and super-
vise officers not to commit perjury or prosecute the innocent.224
The court concluded that where proper conduct is so obvious, the
plaintiff could not support an inference of deliberate indifference
unless there is a history of conduct so that the obvious proper re-
sponse is no longer likely.225
To be on notice of an injury caused by a municipal policy, the
Second Circuit has held that mere knowledge of an illegal arrest is
221. See Amended Complaint, Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810
(JSM), 1999 WL 105026 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999), reprinted in Appendix, supra note
30, at 21-30; Monzon Complaint, supra note 130, paras. 41-44.
222. Cf Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that a
§ 1983 claim against a police department involving perjury by the police survived
summary judgment because, while an officer usually does not have to be trained not
to commit perjury, plaintiff might show a pattern of perjury in the face of which the
failure to train or supervise would become deliberate indifference).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 298.
225. The court states:
Where the proper response-to follow one's oath, not to commit the crime
of perjury, and to avoid prosecuting the innocent-is obvious to all without
training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not
"so likely" to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliber-
ate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise ....
... While it is reasonable for city policymakers to assume their employees
possess common sense, where there is a history of conduct rendering this
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insufficient.226 A claim based on a municipality's policy or custom,
"does not necessarily accrue upon the occurrence of a harmful act,
but only later when it is clear, or should be clear, that the harmful
act is the consequence of a [City's] 'policy or custom.' , 227 The cir-
cuit court has noted that its application of this "delayed accrual
theory" is appropriate because "[w]here no single act is sufficiently
decisive to enable a person to realize that he has suffered a com-
pensable injury, the cause of action may not accrue until the wrong
becomes apparent. 2
28
Thus, claims against a municipality based on a "policy or cus-
tom" accrue when the plaintiff "knew or should have known
enough to claim the existence of a 'policy or custom' so that [the
plaintiff can] sue the [municipality]. '"229
In the Clinton and Monzon cases, however, the courts' decisions
did not sufficiently consider how information about an individual
officer's illegal actions could provide information that would put
the plaintiff on notice of a municipal policy that caused the injury.
Rather, the courts accepted that knowledge of one equates with
notice of the other. Yet plaintiffs need more information. In Clin-
ton and Monzon, for example, the plaintiffs needed information
that would connect-in the legal sense-the officers' misconduct
with the City's policy on how to deal with this misconduct. Since
the City's officials had historically publicly claimed to aggressively
discipline corrupt officers, nothing to notify the plaintiffs of the
City's role in facilitating the corruption.230 The plaintiffs needed
credible refutations of the City's own denials. In Clinton and
Monzon, however, the courts imposed a significant burden on the
plaintiffs because they required that the plaintiffs have more
knowledge and insight about the City's actual role in the corrup-
tion than is reasonably possible in a municipal liability case, and
certainly more than the Supreme Court has required in the past.
226. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995)
227. Id.; see also Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a
§ 1983 "claim accrues when the alleged conduct has caused the claimant harm and the
claimant knows or has reason to know of the allegedly impermissible conduct and the
resulting harm").
228. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted in
Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157).
229. Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157 n.17. In Pinaud, the Second Circuit distinguished be-
tween a § 1983 action against an individual and one against a municipality, concluding
that accrual in the former does not foreclose delayed accrual in the latter. Id. (distin-
guishing Eaglestone v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994), which involved claims
against individual defendants, and the case before it which involved a county).
230. Supra note 210, and citations therein.
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In Clinton and Monzon the courts concluded that information
that the plaintiffs testified against individual police officers, and in
Clinton, the Assistant District Attorney's investigation of a corrup-
tion allegation two years after Clinton's unlawful arrest and incar-
ceration, were sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice of municipal
liability claims. However, there is no obvious and direct causal
connection between individual corrupt officers and a municipal
policy. As already noted, the police department regularly denies
any pattern of police misconduct, instead characterizing any and all
bad police actions as aberrations and individual acts that are
neither encouraged nor condoned by the department. 23'
3. Statements' Factual Insufficiency
Assuming individual police officers' bad acts could be the basis
for notice of a municipal liability claim, this would still require
proof of a pattern of conduct. The pattern is the link to the munici-
pality because, absent institutional support or inaction, such re-
peated action could not continue or flourish. However, the case
records in Clinton and Monzon lack the factual development of
such a pattern.
In both cases, the plaintiffs' testimony to juries merely involved
describing what the officers did to them. It did not involve the
description of a pattern, custom, or policy. Indeed, their testimony
could not encompass such allegations because neither was aware of
any such policy at the time of his respective testimony. The plain-
tiffs simply responded to the district attorney's questions regarding
their unlawful arrests.2 32
The statements contained in the affirmation in Clinton also fail
to provide additional suggestive information about a policy of po-
lice misconduct. Neither individually nor collectively can the state-
ments therein be considered to place Clinton on notice of a
municipal claim because this information was about the culpability
of individual officers. These statements do not place him on notice
of the City's training, supervisory, and disciplinary polices and cus-
toms, and what role they played in the advent of his injuries. Cer-
tainly the fact that Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Adoradio
received information that officers lied in Clinton's case, and that
Clinton corroborated this information is not "new" information to
231. Supra note 210, and citations therein.
232. Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Aug. 28, 1998),
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 146; Monzon's Memorandum, supra note 31,
at 6.
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Clinton, for purposes of alerting him to his claims against the City.
He was well aware prior to the filing of the affirmation that the
police fabricated evidence and lied; he knew he was innocent, so
that this information could not alert him to anything more than he
already knew.
The only information set forth in the affirmation that could ar-
guably be construed as information which Clinton did not have
prior to the vacatur of his sentence is ADA Adoradio's assertion
that the ADA was involved in an investigation of allegations of
corruption in the 30th Precinct. At the time of Clinton's illegal
arrest, prosecution, and sentencing, Clinton knew that the individ-
ual ex-police officers involved in his criminal case had lied. Clin-
ton, however, did not have knowledge of the corruption in which
these officers were involved, or the City's involvement in facilitat-
ing and permitting such illegal actions within the 30th Precinct. In
certain situations such a statement might suffice to place a plaintiff
on notice of a pattern, thus alerting the plaintiff of a municipal lia-
bility claim. However, this statement provides nothing more than
information about ADA Adoradio's connection to the 30th Pre-
cinct and Clinton's criminal case.
Equally important is the information left out of the ADA's affir-
mation. The affirmation does not state that ADA Adoradio in-
formed Clinton or his counsel of any substantive information
concerning the corruption scandal and/or the ensuing investigation
in the 30th Precinct.233 It does not say anything about the timing or
scope of the investigation, the bases of the corruption allegations,
or the period covered by the investigation. These are not inconse-
quential matters because it could have been possible that the ADA
was investigating actions that occurred after Clinton's unlawful ar-
rest and incarceration. Alternatively, and just as likely, it could
have been an investigation concerning corruption totally irrelevant
to the unlawful actions that were the basis for Clinton's Monell
claim.234
233. This is the procedural difficulty with the lower and circuit courts' approach.
Since this was a motion to dismiss converted to a summary judgment motion without
the benefit of any pretrial discovery, neither plaintiff nor the City deposed ADA
Adoradio, or otherwise inquired, about the information which the courts imputed to
the plaintiff based on the Affirmation's statements.
234. We can only speculate as to the reasons for this vague statement, but one pos-
sible reason is that the success of the investigation depended on maintaining secrecy
in order to protect the integrity of the investigation, as well as those involved in fer-
reting out the corruption; see also MOLLEN REPORT (finding New York City Police
Department infested with corruption and an institutional reluctance to address cor-
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Neither the grand jury testimony nor the affiant's statements can
be the basis for alerting plaintiffs to a municipal liability claim since
the Second Circuit has recognized that an unlawful arrest and pros-
ecution do not, as a per se matter, put the plaintiff on notice of a
possible municipal liability claim. 23
5
B. Media Coverage
In addition to the plaintiffs' testimony, and the knowledge im-
puted to Clinton based on Assistant District Attorney Adoradio's
affirmation, discussed supra Part III.A, the courts also considered
the effect of news media coverage of the 30th Precinct corruption
scandal. Unlike the court in Monzon, which left these questions
for the jury, the courts in Clinton inappropriately resolved matters
ruption); COMMISSION TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 4 (finding New
York City Police Department failed to adequately address police corruption).
Notably, neither report can be considered, per se, to have placed Clinton on notice
of a municipal liability claim. First, Clinton was incarcerated on the date of the Mollen
Commission Report, thus at best leaving a factual question as to whether he had ac-
cess to the report. The MOLLEN REPORT was issued less than three years prior to
Clinton's filing his complaint, and thus even if treated as a basis for notice, it places
him safely and squarely within the three-year limitations period.
Police corruption is neither unique to nor a recent phenomenon in New York or
any other part of the United States of America. E.g, GAO REPORT, supra note 4
(noting recent police corruption in several United States cities, including New York,
Chicago, and Philadelphia, and specifically their connection to drug-related activities
by the police); Michael Perlstein, Two Convictions Close Corruption Case; Ex-cops
Face Prison for Cocaine Trafficking, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 6, 1998, at B1; Mark
Fazlollah, Civil Rights Groups Criticize Police Forcible Entries in Philadelphia, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 1998; Carol Goar, Breaking the Bond of Trust Philadelphians are
Shaken Over Revelations of a Racism and Corruption Scandal, in the Police Depart-
ment, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 11, 1995, at B5; Kevin Sack, Racism of a Rogue Officer
Casts Suspicion on Police Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 1; Jennifer Mad-
dox, Corrupt Police Taint Communities, STUART NEWS, Aug. 12, 1996, at C1 (discuss-
ing several corruption cases in Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana); Officer Convicted,
supra note 87 (discussing heightened concern about police perjury nationally in light
of 30th Precinct perjury scandal); New Breed of Bad Cop, supra note 86; Officers Held
in Probe of Corruption, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at A31 (discussing string of corrup-
tion cases in New York City); Malcolm Gladwell, In Drug War, Crime Sometimes
Wears a Badge; New York's Latest Police Scandal Reflects Growing Temptations Fac-
ing Officers, WASH. POST, May 19, 1994, at Al (noting a national wave of police cor-
ruption and New York State's scandals); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Admissibility of
Investigation Reports in § 1983 Civil Rights Actions-A User's Manual, in SWORD &
SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983, at 546 (Mary Mas-
saron Ross ed. 1998) (discussing the report by the "Mollen Commission" and other
investigative documents on police misconduct in New York and in Los Angeles,
California).
235. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming
that a single false arrest ordinarily cannot provide notice of an official policy).
NOTICE OF A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM
solely within the province of the jury by considering the impact of
news coverage on Clinton's knowledge of the source of his injury.
One of the issues that should have been reserved for the trier of
fact is whether Clinton was aware of any newspaper articles or
other news coverage of the 30th Precinct scandal or the conviction
and sentencing of the former officers involved in his arrest. Reso-
lution of this issue cannot be achieved on pretrial motions because
these are the very types of factual issues that are within the pur-
view of the trier of fact, and simply cannot be resolved as a matter
of law.
Moreover, the reliance on English-language, mainstream media
in these cases reveals the pervasive racial and cultural influences
that dominate the law. The media sources cited by the courts ex-
hibit their adoption of a standard of knowledge based on newspa-
pers and news programming familiar only to a segment of the New
York population. This standard does not reflect the common expe-
rience of all New Yorkers,236 or of society generally. Not everyone
reads The New York Times, Newsday, or USA Today, or watches
the Cable News Network, the news sources cited by the district
court.2 37
People of color,238 who are victims of police abuse in significant
and disproportionate numbers,2 39 are particularly disadvantaged by
this approach because they do not constitute a majority of the
236. LATIN LOOKS: IMAGES OF LATINAS AND LATINOS IN THE U.S. MEDIA 14-16
(Clara E. Rodriguez ed. 1998) (discussing the disproportionately small amount of
news coverage about Latinos and the small number of Latino correspondents, as well
as the stereotypical portrayal in the news of Latinos as objects and "problem
people").
237. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026 at *2 (citing LEXIS ALLNEWS file). The district
court in Clinton specifically referred to the numbers of stories run in each of these
publications in support of its conclusion that the 30th Precinct scandal was highly
publicized. Id. at *2 & n.1.
238. "People of color" and "communities of color," as used in this article, refer to
African Americans, Asian Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Latinos, and blacks
and Latin Americans of Caribbean ancestry, as well as discrete communities where
they make up a majority of the population.
239. The 30th Precinct scandal is a prime example of this fact since the victims of
the police corruption were black and Latino; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm (discussing
how racial and ethnic minorities are abused by police); Harvey A. Silvergate, 'Race
Profiling' Inflicts Injustice on Individuals, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at A20 (discuss-
ing racial profiling in law enforcement); NEW JERSEY ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLICE POWERS: LAW
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES AND THE MINORITY COMMUNITY IN NEW JERSEY (1994)
(describing the use and abuse of police powers against minorities).
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readers of these print media. For example, although the Clinton
court relied on The New York Times to prove notice, only 8.7% of
daily readers are African American, 4.5% are Asian, and 7.9% are
Latinos, compared with 76.2% who are white.24° This low reader-
ship is a consequence of complex factors. First, mainstream media,
media that is English-language and historically located outside of
immigrant communities or communities of color, does not treat
people of color as a target audience. 241 Apparently this is the case
because these communities are deemed unattractive to advertisers
due to their low purchasing power-an assumption proved inaccu-
rate by the significant buying strength and habits of these
communities. 242
Second, people of color are less likely to be interested in and
persuaded by the issues as covered by the mainstream media be-
cause these news services provide scant coverage of issues of par-
ticular importance to people of color, and what little coverage they
do provide perpetuates racist stereotypes.243 Indeed, "[m]inority
240. SCARBOROUGH RESEARCH, 2000 SCARBOROUGH NEW YORK STUDY (RE-
LEASE 1) (2000) (on file with author). The percentages for the Sunday edition are
comparable.
241. Gilbert Cranberg, Trimming the Fringe: How Newspapers Shun Low-income
readers, 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 52 (1997) (finding that the press does not tar-
get inner-city customers, and that "database marketing relies heavily on identifying
and targeting look-alikes-non-subscribers who most closely resemble existing read-
ers in terms of residence, demographics, and life-style"). The main reason for ignoring
these communities appears to be economic, with newspapers avoiding minorities and
low-income readers because it is assumed they are of little interest to advertisers. This
calculation has proved inaccurate and costly, since people of color have tremendous
consumer buying power, as recognized by the vast number of local advertisers and
telephone businesses who target these communities with focused advertisements. See
THE 2000 NATIONAL HISPANIC MEDIA DIRECTORY, FACT SHEET (2000) (estimating
that in 1999, Hispanic publication advertising sales totaled $650 million) (on file with
author).
These ideas are not limited to those within the media. Advertisement agencies that
have direct influence on advertisement rates and trends in ethnic and/or non-English
media advise avoiding these media, based on stereotypes of the media's clients. Terry
Pristin, Ad Agency Urges Avoiding Black and Hispanic Radio, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1990, at B7 (discussing internal company document that instructed sales representa-
tives to warn companies not to place ads with stations with black and Hispanic listen-
ers because "advertisers should want prospects, not suspects").
242. Supra note 241
243. ROD CARVETH & DIANE ALVERIO, NETWORK BROWNOUT 2000: THE POR-
TRAYAL OF LATINOS IN NETWORK TELEVISION NEWS, 1999 (2000); Sreenath
Sreenivasan, As Mainstream Papers Cut Back, the Ethnic Press Expands, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1996, at D7 (finding that ethnic press fill the gap left by mainstream press by
covering "issues of real concern to immigrants"); Phuong Le, Numbers Double in 7
Years Ethnic Papers Thriving Across U.S., S.F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1993 at Al ("One
reason for the [ethnic] papers' success is that they help new immigrants adjust to life
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journalists and many. of their white colleagues and supervisors say
the overwhelming majority of press coverage still emphasizes the
pathology of minority behavior-drugs, gangs, crime, violence,
poverty, illiteracy-almost to the exclusion of normal, everyday
life."'24" Understandably, stereotypical characterization of African
Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos as "problem people"
and criminals further alienates this population from mainstream
media.245
According to one report based on interviews of 175 reporters,
editors, and publishers from more than thirty newspapers nation-
wide, "no complaint about press coverage was voiced as frequently
by minorities (or acknowledged as readily by many whites) as the
overwhelmingly negative nature of most stories on people of
color-especially blacks and Latinos-and the concomitant ab-
sence of people of color from the mainstream of daily news cover-
age. '246 Indeed, this is the general experience within the news
industry:
[N]ews is what editors who assign stories and put them in the
paper decide is news, and even the most conscientious editors
(and reporters) are largely captives of their own experiences, in-
in the United States.") [hereinafter Numbers Double in 7 Years]. Mark H. Willes, the
Chief Executive Officer of the Times Mirror Co., stated last year that with respect to
the Los Angeles Times circulation, "When we ask Latinos why they don't read the
Times, they said we were not relevant to them, we didn't understand them or respect
them, we didn't cover the things they were most interested in, and they didn't see
themselves reflected in our paper." Mark H. Willes, Remarks at the 1999 Convention
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 15, 1999), in American Society
of Newspaper Editors, It's Your Future: Economic Imperatives of Changing Audi-
ences, 1999 CONVENTION (1999), at http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/convention/
conv99/economicimperatives.htm (last modified Oct.. 27, 1999). He did, however, note
that "[t]hose are all things we can change, and we are." Id.
244. David Shaw, Negative News and Little Else: By Focusing on Crime, Poverty
and Aberrant Behavior, Newspapers Fail to Give a Complete Portrait of Ethnic Minori-
ties, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at Al [hereinafter Negative News and Little Else].
245. See generally, CARVETH & ALVERIO, supra note 243 (listing crime stories as
encompassing 14% of the stories about Latinos); LATIN LOOKS: IMAGES OF LATINAS
AND LATINOS IN THE U.S. MEDIA, supra note 236, at 14-16 (discussing the dispropor-
tionately small amount of news coverage about Latinos and the stereotypical por-
trayal in the news of Latinos as "problem people"); Sreenath Sreenivasan, Newscasts
in Tagalog and Songs in Gaelic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept., 8, 1997, at Dl (examining tremen-
dous growth in ethnic programming due to audience seeking nontraditional televi-
sion); William Glaberson, Minority Journalists Gather to Share Hopes and Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at A12 (reporting on minority journalists and speakers at
journalists convention who "say mainstream news organizations still present a dis-
toned, stereotypical, and sometimes demeaning view of minorities"); Negative News
and Little Else, supra note 244, at Al.
246. Negative News and Little Else, supra note 244, at Al.
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terests and perceptions. In our still largely segregated society,
most whites-especially most whites old enough to be high-
ranking editors-don't have the daily experience and exposure
that would enable them to automatically incorporate a minority
sensibility in their own decision-making.
This means, among other things, that certain stories and issues
aren't covered (or are undercovered), certain stereotypes are
perpetuated, certain errors are made, certain perceptions are
missed (or misunderstood).,47
Third, English-language media is inaccessible to many immi-
grants who do not read English. Consequently, this population re-
lies on second language and ethnic media for news. 248 This last
factor is becoming increasingly important as the number of persons
speaking languages other than English in the United States
grows.2 49 The locus of the lawsuits discussed herein is a prime ex-
ample of the influence and this trend. New York City is a multil-
ingual city, with various enclaves of ethnic and linguistic
communities that thrive, in part, due to their ability to maintain the
integrity of their language and customs within these enclaves.25 °
For many New Yorkers, English is not the language in which they
obtain information or generally communicate with others in the
City or the world. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, 41% of New
Yorkers speak a language other than English at home, 251 a fact that
is not lost on news editors who recognize that the ethnic and vari-
ous non-English language press are attractive to this community.252
247. David Shaw, What's the News? White Editors Make the Call; Newspapers: Even
the Most Conscientious are Often Captives of Their Own Experiences and Perceptions,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at Al. (showing that the percentage of minorities among
professionals on newsroom staff did not exceed 21%, and a majority showed less than
13% of supervisors were minorities).
248. Numbers Double in 7 Years, supra note 243, at Al (reporting increase in ethnic
press and newspapers in languages other than English).
249. For example, as of 1998, more than 10% of the United States population was
of Hispanic origin. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-
525.pdf.
250. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUS-
ING SUMMARY TAPE FILE 3 (1992) (showing that 36.8% of those living in New York
City were "foreign born," including 953,449 persons who entered the United States
between 1980 and 1990; of the 41% who speak a language other than English at
home, 20% do not speak English "very well").
251. Id.
252. At the April 2000 American Society of Newspaper Editors annual convention,
the outgoing president stated in his keynote address that "there is a 'direct correla-
tion' between a person's sense of community and his or her readership of a newspa-
per. 'Thus, we do well to help readers and potential readers feel that they belong to
the community ... ' Cheryl Arvidson, ASNE's Anderson: 'Readers Expect Us to Get
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Indeed, in Monzon, the plaintiff alleged that he did not speak
English. 3
Based on these factors, it is not surprising that these news
sources are neither the most prominent nor the most trusted within
communities of color. It is, therefore, unlikely that members of
these communities would derive information about law enforce-
ment, or perceive as unbiased news about police corruption, from
these sources. Yet this is the most ironic aspect of the courts' ap-
proach and treatment of ethnic and non-English language media.
If people of color do not derive credible information from main-
stream media, and ethnic and non-English language media provide
coverage of police misconduct more expansively than the main-
stream media because of the importance of the issue in these com-
munities, then perhaps this type of coverage would, in the courts'
opinion, place plaintiffs on notice of a municipal injury. We will
not know in Clinton or Monzon, however, precisely because of the
marginalization of these media sources and their coverage of police
misconduct.
What the courts have done, then, is fashion a legal doctrine that
is completely normative, adopting and privileging a particular view
of knowledge and information gathering, a view that is based on
racial and ethnic privilege and dominance within media. This ap-
proach misinterprets the law, subverts the fact-finding role of the
jury, and undermines the goals of § 1983.
The courts in Clinton also impermissibly disregarded the City's
burden on summary judgment to establish that no factual disputes
existed and that the City was entitled to a decision as a matter of
law.254 On its motion, the City presented no evidence that Clinton
actually read the cited news articles, saw the cable television cover-
age, or otherwise had information during his incarceration or after,
garnered through the media, that would alert him, or any reasona-
ble person, to the injury and municipal policy that would be the
basis for a federal civil rights claim against the City of New York.255
Things Right,' Reflect Community, Be in Touch, FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Apr. 11,
2000, at http://www.freedomforum.org/news/2000/04/2000-04-12-07.asp.
253. Monzon Complaint, supra note 130, para. 6; Monzon's Memorandum, supra
note 31, at 19 (citing Monzon Complaint para. 6).
254. Clinton v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3810 (JSM), 1999 WL 105026, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1999).
255. It is unlikely that the City could present such evidence since it did not proceed
with, or request, discovery to discern the plaintiff's actual knowledge, or information
supporting an allegation about what the plaintiff should have reasonably known. See
Clinton Appellate Brief, supra note 170, at 11, n.3.
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This approach flies in the face of civil rights jurisprudence, the
recognized social and legal significance of § 1983 and its remedial
purpose, and the courts' historically broad reading and application
of the law in § 1983 actions.256 As the United States Supreme
Court stated more than two decades ago, "[t]he very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."' 257
Similarly, the City's unsuccessful argument in Monzon, that dis-
cussion of police corruption in the report of the "Mollen Commis-
sion" put Monzon on notice, would have recast the pretrial motion
practice inquiry, and demanded that plaintiff know about every
document and report on police conduct. For example, in Monzon,
the City cited the Mollen Commission's report as a basis for finding
that Monzon was on notice. Such a standard is not only unsup-
ported by the caselaw and § 1983 legislative goals and history, but
is unworkable in practice. It raises questions as to access to docu-
ments and reports, and fails to resolve the more subjective problem
of what type of information in these reports would place a plaintiff
on notice of a municipal liability claim.
The difference in the courts' treatment of media coverage in
these two cases is revealing. In the Clinton case, the lower court
concluded that the precinct scandal was "a major news item, 25 8
further justifying the court's decision that Clinton was on notice
more than three years before filing the complaint, and conse-
quently time barred from bringing suit. By contrast, the district
court in Monzon concluded that the impact of newspaper reports
on the plaintiff's constructive knowledge was a question for the
jury.
9
One explanation for the difference in treatment may be that the
media coverage was used as additional justification, rather than the
sole or even primary justification, for concluding that the plaintiff
256. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 (1972) (stating
that § 1983 "must be given the meaning and sweep that [its] origins and [its] language
dictate") (footnote omitted); Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 73
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It would be difficult to imagine a statute more
clearly designed 'for the public good,' and 'to prevent injury and wrong,' than
§ 1983.").
257. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
258. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
259. Monzon v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 4872 (LMM), 1999 WL 1120527, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1999).
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was on notice in Clinton. In the lower and circuit Clinton opinions,
the primary basis for concluding the plaintiff was on notice was
ADA Adoradio's affirmation and the fact that the plaintiff testified
before a grand jury about the investigation of one of the named
defendant ex-police officers more than three years prior to filing
the complaint. 26° Thus, both the district and circuit courts were sat-
isfied that he was on notice based on information and events re-
lated to him specifically, rather than general news coverage of a
police scandal. However, in Monzon, the district court determined
that there was no basis for concluding, as a matter of law, that
Monzon was on notice prior to contact from the District Attorney's
Office for purposes of testifying against one of the named ex-police
officer defendants, such contact having occurred less than three
years before the filing of the complaint.
These cases may be harmonized if they are interpreted to mean
that media coverage may support a finding of constructive notice
and possible untimeliness where there is another, primary, basis for
a court to find that the plaintiff was on notice. As a corollary, the
courts may also have been influenced by the extent and timing of
plaintiff's personal participation in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the individual police officers. The problem with this analy-
sis, as previously discussed, is that it fails to fully consider and
account for the difference between claims against individuals and
those against municipalities for policy-driven actions. They are dif-
ferent doctrinally and legally-the former against an individual
who may claim immunity from suit for his or her own actions, while
the latter is based on a causal connection between a government
policy and the implementation of that policy through municipal
representatives' actions, which is not protected by § 1983 immunity
defenses.26'
PART IV
Plaintiffs in Clinton and Monzon invoked the doctrine of equita-
ble tolling as an alternative basis for the survival of their claims.262
260. See Clinton v. City of New York, No. 99-7336, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 29,
1999); Clinton, 1999 WL 105026 at *2.
261. For a discussion of the individual immunity defenses available in a § 1983 ac-
tion, see NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, §§ 7-8; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, supra note 10, § 9; Robert F. Brown, Individual Immunity Defenses
under § 1983, in SWORD AND SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SEC-
TION 1983, at 510-45 (Mary Massaron Ross ed., 1998).
262. Equitable tolling must be distinguished from equitable estoppel, although the
two are often discussed together. Equitable tolling stops the statutory time clock for a
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The Clinton courts contemplated the plaintiff's argument, while the
Monzon court would not even consider the argument.263
In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the Second Cir-
cuit applies equitable tolling to § 1983 cases where the plaintiff
"submit[s] non-conclusory evidence of a conspiracy or other fraud-
ulent wrong which precluded his possible discovery of the harms
that he suffered. ,264 In Keating v. Carey,26 5 the Second Circuit ex-
plained that a defendant's fraudulent actions may be the basis for
delaying the time of accrual until the plaintiff discovers the basis
for the cause of action. The district court in Clinton rejected, as
affirmed on appeal, Clinton's request to apply these principles to
his case.266 The former police officer defendants' intentional con-
cealment of their misconduct and the City's official policy and cus-
tom, prevented the plaintiff from learning or having reason to
certain period, usually resulting in the party proceeding with the action. BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver §§ 27-32, 46-47
(2000); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §§ 58-112 (1996 & Supp. 2000). Equitable estop-
pel prohibits the opposition from raising the claim of untimeliness based on actions
taken by that party in misleading or misrepresenting information to the other party
which resulted in some adverse consequences to the plaintiffs. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions §§ 146-48, 150
(1970 & Supp. May 2000); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 33 85-86, 88-91 (1996 &
Supp. 2000).
263. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2; Monzon, 1999 WL 1120527.
264. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Dory v.
Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
1994)) (emphasis in original).
In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), the Supreme Court stated that
equitable tolling principles based on the fraudulent concealment of information by
the defendant apply to every federal statute of limitations. In Hardin v. Straub, 490
U.S. 536, 539 (1989), however, the Court reemphasized its prior ruling (as set forth in
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 483, 483-86 (1980), and Chardon v. Soto, 462
U.S. 50 (1983)) that state tolling provisions should be borrowed along with state stat-
ute of limitations in § 1983 cases. There has been some difference of opinions among
the circuits as to the effect of Hardin on Holmberg, as applied to § 1983 matters, with
some courts construing these Supreme Court cases to permit only the application of
the state's tolling rules, and not federal equitable tolling principles. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the applicability of equitable tolling to § 1983 cases, including cita-
tions to and case discussions of court opinions interpreting Hardin and Holmberg, see
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 9:34; SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGA-
TION, supra note 10, § 12.5.
265. 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Under federal law, when the defendant fraudu-
lently conceals the wrong, the time does not begin running until the plaintiff discov-
ers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the cause of
action."). Although the Second Circuit in Keating referred to equitable estoppel, id. at
382, the Second Circuit has subsequently relied on Keating in its discussions of equita-
ble tolling in § 1983 cases. E.g., Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Keating). I will rely
on the Second Circuit's interpretation of its own precedents on this issue.
266. Supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
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know of the information that was the basis of his municipal liability
claims within the three-year statue of limitations. Thus, equitable
tolling should have applied given that such a plaintiff is the quintes-
sential litigant entitled to the benefits of equitable tolling
principles.
The plaintiff's claims are precisely the type envisioned as benefi-
ciaries of the doctrine of equitable tolling. The unlawfulness of the
former police officers' conduct depended directly upon the surrep-
titious nature of their actions and on the complex web of lies and
deceit that concealed their actions from the plaintiff and the other
victims of their nefarious actions. Maintaining secrecy from the
victims was essential to the success and continued existence of the
fraud. The District Attorney and United States Attorney conceded
as much by the very fact that the corruption investigation was se-
cret and required cooperation of various police officers in the pre-
cinct.267 Concealment is the essence of the fraud in which these ex-
officers participated.
The district court refused to apply equitable tolling in this case
because the court concluded that the City did not "hide the rogue
officers' conduct beyond that time necessary to conduct an effec-
tive investigation. ' 268 However, the court failed to elucidate when
the necessary time expired, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the investigation ended more than three years prior to
the filing of the plaintiff's lawsuit.
The district court also failed to consider the derivative effect of
the individual defendants' fraud upon the municipal liability claim.
The City's official custom facilitated, maintained, and ignored the
actions of the individual defendants, resulting in the conduct giving
rise to the plaintiff's claim. Thus, equitable tolling should have ap-
plied. Failing to invoke the doctrine in favor of the plaintiff re-
warded the City for the actions of its employees' in successfully
concealing their unlawful actions, and denied plaintiff a remedy,
despite his having lost two years of his life while unlawfully incar-
cerated in a state prison.
PART V
A determination of whether a plaintiff has notice of a Monell-
based claim-when a plaintiff knows or "should have known" that
267. Letter from Mary Jo White, United Sates Attorney, by Assistant United States
Attorney Michael Horowitz to United States District Judge Lawrence M. McKenna
(Apr. 2, 1997), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 30, at 102-103.
268. Clinton, 1999 WL 105026, at *2.
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she or he has been injured as a consequence of a municipal pol-
icy-requires assessing the importance and impact of various facts
and events in a case. Yet the plaintiff may not have any actual
knowledge of such information. The task of obtaining this infor-
mation is particularly complex in a municipal liability case because
the injury must result from the implementation of the institutional
defendant's policy.
One solution to this accrual problem is for the courts to focus
solely on the specific information about the municipality and its
policy that is the alleged basis for the plaintiff's injury. In the Clin-
ton and Monzon cases, this would have been the point in time
when the plaintiffs' arrests, incarcerations, and prosecutions re-
sulted from the 30th Precinct corruption that occurred as a direct
consequence of the City's policy, practices, or customs. This ap-
proach accurately and fairly imposes upon the plaintiff the burden
of diligently filing a complaint, based on what she or he knows or
should know about the institutional actor's policies and role as re-
lated to the plaintiff's injuries. It is directly connected to the ac-
crual of the claim against the municipal defendant. Thus,
information about the individual municipal employees, such as the
information gathered from the plaintiffs' testimony against individ-
ual police officers, as well as information contained in the assistant
district attorney's affirmation concerning his participation in an in-
vestigation of allegations of corruption, are irrelevant to accrual.
Nor would this information serve as the basis for a finding of no-
tice, absent some connection between the policy and the plaintiffs'
injuries. Otherwise, notice of the injuries resulting from the indi-
vidual officer's actions would also provide notice of a municipal
liability claim, a theory which the Second Circuit rejected several
years ago.269
While it may be possible in rare cases that notice of injury caused
by a police officer will place a plaintiff on notice of injury caused
by a municipal policy, those cases are more likely to arise where
there is an official policy accessible to the general public. In con-
trast, cases where the City asserts that police corruption and mal-
feasance are aberrational and individual and where police
misconduct has never linked to a City policy or practice, notice of a
municipal policy for § 1983 purposes will include less direct and
obvious municipal actions. In cases involving municipal practices
and customs, those acts which have "not received formal approval
269. See Pinaud, 52 F.3d 1139.
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through the body's official decisionmaking channels . . . [and]
[a]lthough not authorized by written law ... could well be so per-
manent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with
the force of law. 2 7
0
Courts should also consider the plaintiff's pre-discovery position.
When a municipality challenges a Monell claim in a motion to dis-
miss or a summary judgment motion, courts should consider the
obstacles the plaintiff faces in asserting a claim against a municipal
entity for police misconduct. A plaintiff asserting a Monell claim
may encounter unique difficulties such as defining institutional ac-
tions only discernible after the plaintiff gains access to municipal
records and files that may be otherwise inaccessible because of
confidentiality guarantees.27'
Determinations as to whether news coverage is sufficient to
place a plaintiff on notice of a § 1983 municipal liability claim
should be treated as questions of fact for the jury. Courts should
not make per se decisions that, as a matter of law, particular media
coverage has met the accrual standard. Otherwise, the courts are
likely to adopt mainstream media standards that do not take into
account or reflect the experiences of § 1983 plaintiffs, or the dy-
namics of multilingual, multicultural communities.
Whether the news source is one of credibility and dependability
within a community on a particular issue should also be a deter-
mining factor. Regardless of whether a jury or a judge resolves the
question of the impact of news coverage on plaintiff's knowledge
of a claim, such determinations must be based on the specifics of
the actual coverage, as well as the news providers involved. The
court should consider the availability and substance of coverage by
highly visible information sources that are well recognized within
the plaintiff's community and with a significant distribution and
270. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970) (footnote omitted)).
271. For example, a plaintiff may only discern from a protracted and lengthy record
of misconduct by individual officers that there is a practice, custom or policy at the
root of this misconduct. However, the individual officers may have certain privacy
rights that make access to such records difficult or impossible for a prospective plain-
tiff prior to filing of a lawsuit with its attendant benefit of discovery. E.g., N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAW § 50-a (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000); John M. Leventhal, Do Not
Open Unless .... , 214 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the purpose and application of
§ 50-a); see also Richard N. Winfield, Decision in Schenectady Case Denies Access To
Records of Police Guilty of Misconduct, 71 N.Y. ST. B. J. 37 (1999) (discussing impact
of New York State Court of Appeals decision denying public disclosure of records of
police misconduct incident under state's Freedom of Information Law because infor-
mation is protected under § 50-a).
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readership within the community. The court also should consider
whether the coverage conflicted or cast doubt on the mainstream
news sources' coverage.
Further, the courts should consider the racial and ethnic ele-
ments involved in police misconduct cases. For people of color
who are victims of police abuse, their perceptions of that abuse
differs and is at odds with the dominant norms and perceptions of
police misconduct as individualized and unsupported by institu-
tions. The role of prevalence and dominance of race in law en-
forcement should be a factor militating in favor of a § 1983
plaintiff.
These recommendations would have affected the outcome in the
Clinton case. The court should have recognized that the plaintiff's
testimony and the ADA's statement were insufficient, as a matter
of law, to put the plaintiff on notice because they concerned indi-
vidual officers' bad acts without any direct or obvious causal con-
nection to a municipal policy. Additionally, there was a two-year
lapse between the underlying governmental actions and the affir-
mation, raising unresolvable questions as to the nature and applica-
bility to Clinton of the investigation mentioned in the affirmation.
Alternatively, the court could have determined that the suffi-
ciency of the testimony and the ADA's affirmation were matters
for the jury and inappropriate for decision by motion to dismiss or
summary judgment motion. In this scenario, the plaintiff and the
City could present additional evidence and arguments regarding
what information was available to the plaintiff during the years
prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Similarly, the evidence and argu-
ments that the news coverage created a "news alert" environment,
so as to put Clinton on notice, should have been resolved by the
jury and not the judiciary, as the court in Monzon concluded.
The legislative intent and public policy behind § 1983 assumes a
broad and generous reading of the statute, and is best effectuated
by judicial recognition of the importance of civil rights litigation in
providing a vehicle for change of state-based misconduct, such as
police corruption. Still valid today is the United States Supreme
Court's assessment, made a quarter century ago, that, "[Section]
1983 provides 'a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under
the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Con-
stitution and laws of the Nation.' The high purposes of this unique
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remedy make it appropriate to accord the statute 'a sweep as broad
as its language.' ,,272
272. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1985) (quoting United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). Hopefully, for the sake of New York's citizenry and the
individual victims of police corruption, there will be no more plaintiffs similarly situ-
ated to Mr. Clinton or Mr. Monzon.
AS!
